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  The limitations of legislation in the field of business law: a study of developments in 
company law, bankruptcy and diligence.    
Abstract  
This critical appraisal demonstrates three particular themes that are dominant in certain areas 
of business law, these themes being:  
 achieving the balance between the interests of debtors and creditors,   
 the use of legislation to alter business and social behaviour and   
 the tension between the intention of the legislation and the actuality.    
These themes are demonstrated throughout my two submitted publications, Company Law, 
and the Annotated edition of the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007. These 
form a corpus of work on Scottish business law and in particular, company law, bankruptcy 
law and diligence.     
The critical appraisal is a review of certain aspects of this corpus, indicating how and for 
what purpose these books have been written, the use and effectiveness of the law in each 
area, and analysing the degree to which the legislation has been successful.  
The process of writing this critical appraisal caused me to reflect  on the drafting of the 
Companies Act 2006,  recent developments in case law on the corporate veil and in particular 
the efficacy of section 172 of the Companies Act 2006. This encouraged me to carry out 
further research on how well (or not) s.172 had worked. This proved a particularly fruitful 
area of research and so has been given substantial treatment in its own right in Chapter 4.  
The Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007 is subjected to an analysis in the light 
of the three themes to show how the Act was intended to realign the priorities of the needs of 
debtors and creditors in the light of changed social views on creditors’ rights and on 
bankruptcy. 
An essential point of this critical appraisal is that legal theories are not as important in the 
drafting and passing of legislation as is sometimes suggested. This critical appraisal argues 
that within the areas under discussion, attempts to fit the final legislation into theoretical 
frameworks do not adequately take account of the political reality underpinning the passing 
of the legislation. It also argues that there is a schism between political attempts to alter 
business and social behaviour, or, as the case may be, to alter the interests of debtors and 
creditors, through the use of legislation, and what actually happens. In the case of diligence, 
political considerations worked to defeat some ends of the proposed legislation; and in the 
case of bankruptcy, the reforms introduced by Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 
2007, though welcome, required further amendment.  In the case of company law, the 
legislation was ambitious but naïve.   
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Chapter 1 
Summary 
This chapter indicates the themes of the critical appraisal, explains the publications that will 
be used to illustrate the themes and explains how the research methodology ties in with the 
themes of the critical appraisal.  
 
Introduction. 
This critical appraisal proposes that there are three themes running throughout business law, 
with particular applicability to company law, bankruptcy law and the law relating to diligence 
(the enforcement of the payment of debt within Scotland).  
These three themes are as follows:  
 achieving the balance between the interests of debtors and creditors,   
 the use of legislation to alter business and social behaviour and   
 the tension between the intention of the legislation and the actuality.    
These themes will be addressed throughout this critical appraisal by reference to two 
publications written by the author, namely Company Law, and the Annotated edition of the 
Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act, 2007. This critical appraisal will also take 
account of current developments within these areas of law since the books were written and 
since the legislation on which the books were based was passed. These three themes do not 
apply to the subjects under consideration and the publications mentioned equally, so that 
there is more to say on the second and third themes in the context of company law than there 
is in the context of diligence.  
Achieving the balance between the interests of debtors and creditors  
Finding the balance between the interests of debtors and creditors is as perennial a task as 
finding the balance between master and servant or landlord and tenant. From time to time 
laws are introduced, usually to benefit one side or the other, according to whose political 
interests are best served. Historically, generally speaking, creditors, commonly merchants or 
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landowners, were in a good position to frame laws that protected their interests1, but as even 
merchants and landowners become debtors themselves, it was prudent to have laws that were 
not too draconian. Scotland adopted the Roman law of bankruptcy as part of its reception of 
Roman law, but while the law was not unfair to debtors, its main failing was that it was only 
suitable for substantial property owners. It was not designed for people living on benefits, or 
those with minimal assets or income, thus preventing poor people taking advantage of formal 
bankruptcy procedures to be relieved of their debts. Bankruptcy law has had to adapt. Recent 
changes have made bankruptcy available to most sectors of the population, although the fact 
that section 5  of the Bankruptcy and Debt Advice (Scotland) Act 2014 (the Minimal Assets 
Procedure) has recently been issued suggests that previous procedures were still not 
satisfactory for the very poor. At the same time, the relative ease with which debtors may 
soon seek relief from their debts may come at a price. Perhaps the traditional Scottish virtues 
of thrift, responsibility and honouring one’s debts are being eroded.2 This critical appraisal 
discusses the extent to which the law has altered the balance in this area between debtor and 
creditor. 
 
Within diligence the rules traditionally favoured the creditor3, but the changes to the law 
within the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007 amended this. Now for 
creditors to assert their rights they have to follow complex procedures designed to give many 
opportunities to the debtor to avoid the diligence or to redeem the debt. This has improved 
the position for debtors, but it has also made it harder for creditors to get their money back, 
and pushed up creditors’ costs of recovery. Such costs will be passed on to the debtors. The 
balance between debtor and creditor has shifted here too and this is explored later in this 
critical appraisal. 
 
By contrast, the balance between debtor and creditor is very different in company law. A 
limited company bears its own debts and by law only under very restricted circumstances are 
                                                 
1 For example, the Adjudication Act 1672. 
2 Traditionally on Hogmanay people in Scotland would settle their debts in order to start the new year afresh. 
See Donna Heddle, Director of the Centre for Nordic Studies at Orkney and Shetland College, University of the 
Highlands and Islands, at  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-highlands-islands-20596225 (accessed 4 
January 2015).    
3 For example, until the changes in the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007, a creditor effecting 
diligence on a debtor's bank account could freeze the entire sum in the bank account, even if it were in excess of 
sums due to the creditor, and even if the debtor needed the money in the account to feed his family.   
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the company’s directors responsible for the company’s debts. This can and sometimes does 
lead to a cavalier attitude to a company’s creditors, and to shareholders, because the directors 
are very unlikely personally to be at risk.4 Especially in the field of banking, the effect of 
dubious business practices tend to be seen several years after the directors have obtained their 
own benefits, while the bank’s shareholders and indeed customers remain at risk long after 
the directors have moved on. In the light of recent case law, the use of the corporate veil to 
make it difficult to obtain redress from directors is particularly explored in Chapter 4. 
 
The use of law to alter business and social behaviour 
The law is often used to make people behave in one way or another, usually for some 
perceived benefit. For example, the Clean Air Act 1956 was passed to prevent London being 
suffused in smog. There were penalties if people burned the wrong type of coal. There were 
clear aims and clear sanctions. Laws against smoking in public buildings5, laws against drink-
driving6 and laws requiring people to wear seat-belts7 all come within the same “behavioural” 
category of law. Few could object to these laws. But interestingly, as will be explained, the 
last few years have seen the development of laws that are intended to make businesspeople 
behave “better” or to act in a moral, honourable or socially desirable way, sometimes with 
sanctions (as with the Equality Act 2010) for non-compliance. The best reason for behaving 
with integrity in business matters is that treating customers and other businessmen fairly, 
broadly speaking, helps a business-owner build up a prosperous business with a long term 
future.8 At the same time in business it is unrealistic to expect every businessperson to behave 
with such integrity. Although deceit or fraud is unacceptable, not volunteering information, 
or being “economical with the truth”, is quite often seen as “fair game” or to be expected. 
Following Robert Maxwell’s looting of the Mirror Group Pension Scheme and accounting 
chicanery in American companies such as Enron and Worldcom, it was clear that otherwise 
intelligent businesspeople were prepared to act indefensibly, even though in the long run it 
was not in their interests or their shareholders’ interests to do so. In an effort to prevent this, 
the Companies Act 2006, and current rules on corporate governance, expect directors to act 
                                                 
4 For example, the takeover of ABN Amro by RBS in 2007. 
5 Smoking, Health and Social Care (Scotland) Act 2005. 
6 Road Safety Act 1967. 
7 Transport Act 1981. 
8 For example, witness the success of the retail store John Lewis and its supermarket partner, Waitrose, both 
renowned for the fairness with which they treat their staff and their customer service.  
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thoughtfully in the management of their companies and to take account of wider interests 
other that the benefit to themselves or the return to shareholders.  
By contrast, the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007 hoped to provide debtors 
with a life-line, and by making sequestration more easily available to make bankruptcy less 
of a social stigma. Bankruptcy is sometimes the result of poor judgement, but it can also be 
because a blameless business’s own debtors are unable to pay their bills to that business. It 
was also thought that making sequestration easier might make lenders less reckless in their 
lending policies. Finally, reducing the period of bankruptcy to only one year might encourage 
new businesses to be set up. We can see the same policy approach in the proposals in the 
Bankruptcy and Debt Advice (Scotland) Act 2015 to introduce compulsory financial 
education and compulsory debt advice for certain debtors.9 It is possible that this may yet 
prove to make a considerable difference to debtors’ behaviour – depending on how it is 
implemented and how seriously it is taken by debtors.  
 
Tension between intention of the legislation and the actuality 
 
This theme is connected with the previous theme. The previous theme deals with the political 
will to use the law to force some form of apparently desirable behaviour. The third theme 
explores how well the law works in practice. Inevitably there is some degree of overlap.  
While politicians use the law to try to change people’s behaviour in business, the people at 
the receiving end of the law, the ones who are supposed to be obeying the law, the 
businesspeople, the company director, or indeed a creditor or debtor, may not necessarily 
share the politicians’ enthusiasm for change, particularly if it is going to be inconvenient, 
expensive or contrary to their accustomed practice. They may be tempted to find ways round 
the law, to exploit any weaknesses in its drafting or to “tick the boxes” without actually 
engaging with the point of the new law. A perennial difficulty is trying to get people to obey 
not just the letter of the law but the spirit of the law, particularly if they cannot see any 
obvious immediate benefit to them in doing so.10 As indicated in the previous paragraphs, the 
                                                 
9 S.2.  
10 A parallel arises in the 2012 Governmental review of the Equality Act 2010, to be found at 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/equalities/equality-act/. Although there was considerable support for many of the 
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UK Government wants directors to be more thoughtful in their decision-making. This is 
demonstrated by s.172(1) of the Companies Act 2006 which explicitly requires directors to 
“have regard” to various stakeholder interests. This critical appraisal in Part 2 of Chapter 4 
argues that the intentions of Parliament in that Act were in practice completely ignored, at 
least as far as certain large companies were concerned. 
 
The reforms to bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007 have in 
many respects on a practical basis made bankruptcy more accessible. However, as indicated 
above, one of the original intentions of the Act was to remove the social stigma of bankruptcy 
and to encourage entrepreneurs to put their difficulties behind them with relative ease.11 It is 
not evident that the stigma has been removed or entrepreneurs encouraged; other social and 
economic considerations have to be taken into account before a judgement may be made on 
this matter. The changes to the law of diligence in the same Act were introduced to ensure 
that nearly all assets belonging to a debtor could be subject to diligence, thus making 
creditors more likely to get their debts paid, and possibly ensuring that debtors were more 
cautious in taking on debt. As will be explained later in chapter 4, politically this turned out 
to be unacceptable or impracticable.  
 
Much of the law discussed within this critical appraisal is based on statute, which means that 
politicians were the ones who ultimately approved it. Business law is a pragmatic discipline 
which ideally recognises the interests of competing parties and tries to find a fair and 
workable, not necessarily a theoretical, balance between those interests. But business law is 
also a political matter. When what became the Companies Act 2006 was being debated in 
Parliament, there were attempts by the Conservatives to talk out parts of the Bill as they were 
perceived to be bad for business.12 Although the attempted filibuster was not successful, as a 
                                                                                                                                                        
worthy features of the Act, particularly in larger businesses, the review established that there was much less 
support at small business level, where, for example, there was little support for employing people with 
disabilities, especially if such employees were likely to take time off for their disability or cause others to have 
to take on their workload. However admirable the Government policy, it clearly was not welcomed by 
employers. 
11 See The Scottish Government Modernising Bankruptcy and Diligence in Scotland : Draft Bill and 
Consultation July 2004, para. 5.3 and 5.8.  
12 See Jonathan Janogly’s admission of his own attempts at talking out at Hansard, HC, 17 October 2006 at 
column 755. 
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result, some parts were later not given the close scrutiny they might have been given.13 
Similarly the law relating to diligence and bankruptcy was politicised: there were those who 
strongly favoured the interests of debtors against the interests of creditors such as banks, 
credit card companies and local authorities14, and those who pointed out that whether or not 
banks and credit card companies deserved their money, local authorities and many other 
small creditors needed it too.15 The reality is that any law that makes life easier for debtors 
makes life harder for creditors, but more votes are to be had from debtors than from creditors.   
 
The publications that will be used to demonstrate the themes  
1. Company Law 
The first edition of my book, Company Law, was published in 2002 by W.Green. A second 
edition was published in 2005, a third in 2009 and a fourth edition in 2014. It has been 
successful, at least within Scotland. It is required reading at Edinburgh and Strathclyde 
Universities for undergraduate and post-graduate law courses and used at other Scottish 
universities as well. It is part of the reading for the Company and Commercial course in the 
Diploma in Legal Practice, a necessary training stage for all future lawyers in Scotland. It 
sells well to professional lawyers, many law firms buying a copy for their own shelves. It is 
also sold to, for example, public libraries and chambers of commerce.    
The book itself is about 440 pages long (about 200,000 words) and explains and comments 
on all areas of company law, from a company’s incorporation to its demise, taking in all the 
important points of law pertaining to a company, including capital maintenance, insolvency, 
the role and duties of directors, reporting requirements, audits, meetings, flotation of 
companies on the Stock Exchange, takeovers and acquisitions, and insider dealing.  
Guiding purpose of the book 
W.Green, the publishers of this book, had indicated that the readership of Company Law was 
to be both people coming to company law for the first time, or the first time for a while, 
whether as practising lawyers, company directors, or students, and also current practitioners 
                                                 
13 See Hansard, 17 October 2006, Col 744-754,  
14 For example, see the Citizens Advice Bureau (Scotland) Briefing Paper 19, 2005, on arrestments. 
15 As discussed at the Scottish Parliament Enterprise and Culture Committee 18 April 2006 and seen in the 
Official Report therefor. 
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of company law. It was agreed between the author and the publisher that the book would be 
written in the following way:  
 the author should explain the law clearly, in sufficient breadth so that readers could 
see what the overall point of the law is, but in sufficient detail so that they could see 
the finer points of the law as well, and any practical impact;  
 the author should explain the legislation so that when readers later came to read the 
legislation, it would make more sense than it might otherwise; 
 the author should explain the facts of the important cases and their significance; 
 the author should explain the practical benefits of the law and the negative 
consequences of failing to follow the law; 
 the author should not assume that readers would automatically know or understand 
specialist legal, accounting or business terminology; such terminology should be 
explained, but in an informative rather than a patronising manner; 
 the author should bring the subject to life by focussing, where possible, on the human 
side of the subject;  
 the author should write in a way that would enable readers to read the text effortlessly. 
More thoughtful readers might probably also expect to read:  
 some history about the law; 
 some analysis of the effectiveness of the law; 
 forthcoming changes to the law;  
 the reasons for those changes;  
 areas of difficulties within the law, where the law remains uncertain or unsatisfactory; 
 any ethical or moral issues thrown up by the law. 
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The applicability of  Company Law for the demonstration of the themes of this critical 
appraisal 
Company law is a particularly apt area for discussing the balance between creditor and 
debtor, because statute has specifically allowed for the possibility that companies will be 
unable to pay their debts, while most of the time creditors have no right of recourse against 
the companies’ owners or directors. Recently we have seen the compelling corporate veil 
case of Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd.16 This is extensively discussed in the fourth edition of 
Company Law. It is a telling example of the importance of the first theme, the balance 
between the debtor and creditor, and yet its implications are that company law allows 
directors, certainly of larger companies, to take advantage of their position to let their 
companies carry out socially and financially irresponsible activities without the law being 
able to restrain them – as will be discussed later in Chapter 3. Company law is also an apt 
area for discussing the use of the law to influence behaviour, as the Government specifically 
tried to do through the use of section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006. This was the subject 
of considerable debate within the House of Commons on 17 October 2006, but the objections 
to the final wording were withdrawn not because the wording had been resolved but because 
the Members of Parliament who were debating it were unwilling to force changes which 
would have led to the risk of unwelcome confrontation between the House of Lords and the 
House of Commons.17 As a result of writing about it, I was moved to research further into it 
to see to what extent directors of leading companies had in practice paid attention to the 
requirements of (as opposed to being aware of) section 172(1), and to what extent it was 
working at all. This is discussed in Part 2 of Chapter 4.  
2. Annotated edition of the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 20007 
An annotated edition of an Act is one where the author writes an introduction to a new Act, 
and then explains every single section of the Act, commenting on any points of law or 
practice.  This particular Act has 227 sections and five schedules and in its time was the 
longest Act from the Scottish Parliament.18 The Act substantially amended the law on 
bankruptcy and diligence, set up a framework for new regulation of sheriff officers and 
messengers at arms, proposed a new registration system for floating charges, and provided 
changes to admiralty actions within Scottish waters. Although the Act received royal assent, 
                                                 
16 [2013] UKSC 34 
17 Hansard, HC , 17 October 2006, Col. 790.  
18 The author’s introduction and commentary amount to about 60,000 words in total.   
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not all the parts of the Act have been implemented, some for financial reasons, some for 
political reasons.  
The 2007 Act was, as will be explained hereafter, explicitly designed to tidy up, update and 
improve the existing law on bankruptcy and diligence, to take account of changes in social 
circumstances since previous legislation and to enable creditors to be able, if necessary, to 
have rights over any assets of a debtor, other than those needed for the debtor’s (and the 
debtor’s family) immediate circumstances. The 2007 Act was intended to make the burden of 
bankruptcy less of a mark of social failure and to make it easier for debtors to be relieved of 
their debts when there was little prospect of them ever being able to redeem their debtors. 
The book itself is a commentary on the Act generally together with notes on each section of 
the Act. The book is widely used in civil litigation. 
Background to the 2007 Act  
Following work originally carried out by Professor Maher at the Scottish Law Commission19, 
the 2007 Act was the result of a proposal in 2005 by the future Lord Wallace of Tankerness, 
at the time the Liberal MSP and deputy first minister of Scotland, that the Scottish Executive, 
as it then was20, should review the laws relating to bankruptcy and diligence to make them 
more suitable for the changed circumstances of the 21st century. The Scottish Executive was 
instructed to draft a Bill which eventually became the 2007 Act. It was introduced to the 
Culture and Enterprise Committee (under the chairmanship of Alex Neil MSP) of the Scottish 
Parliament in late December 2005 and received royal assent in January 2007. It is 
conventional within the Scottish Parliament that when a select committee is taking evidence 
about a particularly complex matter, it invites people to apply for the position of legal adviser 
to the committee. I was fortunate enough to be appointed to this position.  
Part of the intention of the 2007 Act was to improve the law relating to diligence (as 
explained in the previous chapter) and to enable debtors to apply for their own sequestration 
in a less formal manner than had been the case. Previously debtors had to petition their own 
sheriff court, a process that was more elaborate than was needed for some debtors. Since the 
2007 Act there are now various simple methods for applying directly to the Accountant in 
Bankruptcy for one’s own sequestration, and the sheriff court is only used when creditors or 
                                                 
19 Scottish Law Commission Report 207, May 2001, 
20 Now the Scottish Government. 
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trustees, dissatisfied with the lack of compliance of debtors with the terms of their trust 
deeds, wish to petition for debtors’ sequestration. The 2007 Act also made other changes to 
bankruptcy, proposed a new register of floating charges, set up a new Scottish Civil 
Enforcement Commission, and made some changes to Debt Arrangement Programmes. Not 
all of these were brought into force, as will be discussed shortly.  
The applicability of  Annotated edition of the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act  
2007 for the demonstration of the themes of this critical appraisal 
The 2007 Act provides a clear example of the Scottish Parliament trying to alter the balance 
between debtor and creditor, on the whole successfully, while setting up a coherent method of 
ensuring that debtors should pay their debts and being forced to do so by means of diligence 
against all their assets, or if that is not possible, by having a fair process of bankruptcy. 
However, as will be seen, political and practical considerations intervened to preclude the use 
of diligence against all assets, thus emphasising the gap between the legislative intention and 
the actuality of its implementation. The Act also hoped to alter social behaviour by reducing 
the stigma of bankruptcy and to encourage business generally by having a shorter period of 
bankruptcy than had been the case previously. 
 
Methodology of legal research in the area of business law 
 
Business law is an important area of law in practice, but a difficult one in which to carry out 
research in the traditional sense of discovering something new, writing it up and showing 
what could be done with it, as for example, a chemist discovering the properties of a new 
compound, or a musicologist discovering a hitherto lost piece of music. There is little 
statistical research on business law. Except in a few areas, mostly involving insolvency, it 
does not lend itself to measurement and quantification, and for reasons of commercial secrecy 
few lawyers reveal much information about their clients’ activities. Even on a comparative 
basis, business law in one jurisdiction tends to be similar to that in other jurisdictions, 
because any business law system that is out of kilter with most other business law systems 
will not attract outside investment.  
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Accordingly my legal research in business law involves examining recent legislation, and in 
following the application of the law in the wider commercial world, in order to consider  
(a) what the law was intended to achieve according to the consultation exercises 
and white papers that preceded the first draft of the relevant legislation; 
 
(b) what the wider implications of the new legislation are likely to be;  
 
(c) what the law actually is on a close construction of the wording of the 
legislation or the close reading of any relevant case law arising from the 
legislation;   
(d) how the law is operating in practice;  
(e) to what extent the practice of the law has deviated from its original intentions; 
(f) whether or not the intentions of the politicians approving the legislation are 
capable of being realised; 
(g) if and how the law could be improved. 
 
Although it is important to establish what the law actually is, the wider implications can be 
important too since they may require lawyers to revisit existing practice or warn their clients 
that what might have previously been legally acceptable may no longer be so (or conversely 
that something previously forbidden was now acceptable).  
It will be noted that these seven approaches to research are not far removed from the three 
themes of this critical appraisal. The Companies Act 2006 and the Bankruptcy and Diligence 
etc. (Scotland) Act 2007 were both preceded by extensive consultation with the aim of 
improving and rationalising the law in these areas in order to achieve a better balance 
between the various interests, in particular debtor and creditor. In each case one can see those 
aspects of business and social behaviour that the Government was trying to influence. The 
research process as indicated reveals to what extent the Government’s intentions were 
achieved, what happened instead, and the extent to which the law may be improved for the 
future.  
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The applicability of the three themes to this critical appraisal 
There are different ways of carrying out a critical appraisal of legislation. Because of the 
Parliamentary process, it is also possible to chart a Bill’s progress  from discussion papers, to 
white and green papers, and finally to the Act itself. In the process the original ideas behind 
the Act are refined, improved or discarded, and in theory reflect the wishes of Parliament. 
The Parliamentary process in effect is a democratic method of making a critical appraisal. 
This does not necessarily mean that legislation subjected to such a critical appraisal is good 
legislation but at least it is carried out  by people  who have been elected to carry out this 
task, and who, one hopes, brings a breadth of experience to this activity. A drawback of this 
particular type of critical appraisal is that it ceases once the Bill is enacted, even if the 
legislation is subsequently reviewed.   
Legislation can also be subject to other types of critical appraisal, such as a Marxist approach, 
a nationalist approach, or a belief-system (such as Christianity) approach, each of which 
would no doubt shine some limited light upon the legislation in question. What, however, 
they might lack would be breadth: they would be partial and only take account of certain 
aspects of the legislation.   
By contrast, the advantage of using the three themes  of this critical appraisal as a means of 
critiquing the legislation is that the broad combination of the themes both illuminates the 
intentions of the legislation, and the practicalities of how the legislation ended up being 
drafted in the way it was, but also casts light on how well the final legislation actually 
achieves what it was originally intended to do. In a sense these three themes enable a 
judgement to be made on the legislation on its own terms, past, present and future. 
Furthermore, although these themes are being used in this critical appraisal for these 
purposes, it is arguable that the latter two themes would be good yardsticks to use for many 
other types of legislation, and as regards the first theme, the balance between debtors’ and 
creditors’ interests, while this is specific to business, much other law is also about a balance 
between competing interests. For example, family law is a balance between parental rights 
and children’s rights, and environmental law is a balance between the right to exploit the 
environment and the need for the environment not to be despoiled for future generations. The 
three themes are universal themes, and it is not entirely fanciful to say that good starting point 
for a successful review of most legislation would be always to use these three themes.   
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The research process in business law 
A minister’s immediate responsibility often ends with the press release that originally 
accompanied the introduction of his or her Bill through Parliament, though it is common for 
there to be a review of the legislation some years later. In the meantime, it is the task of 
researchers/commentators on the law to study the new Act to bring out the important parts 
that most practitioners, and indeed the public, will need to know about, and to render the 
words of the Act into terms that everyone can understand. This is because despite recent 
efforts by Parliamentary draftsmen to make legislation more user-friendly, it is rarely easy to 
express some legislation’s more complex provisions.21  
It is not usually enough for researchers/commentators to have read the new Act; it is normally 
necessary to have read the original recommendations from the Law Commissions or other 
bodies that prompted the legislation in the first place; and it is necessary to have read the 
previous case law that the legislation wished to overturn, plus to have read any new cases that 
have been decided since the new legislation came into force in order to see if the judges are 
understanding the new law properly. In addition it is important to have read the Parliamentary 
debates that underpinned the passing of the legislation in order to establish what the 
politicians thought they were doing when they approved the new law. Finally, depending on 
the type of publication, (and this particularly applies to Company Law and the Annotated 
Edition of the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007), the commentator has to 
consider any unforeseen or unintended consequences of the law, the correctness of any recent 
decisions and the ingenious routes that lawyers may use to thwart the intended effects of the 
law.  
All these factors must be absorbed and considered, and then, and this is where true legal 
scholars show their art, the researcher/commentator must re-present the law by amalgamating 
the old law, the new laws, the original recommendations (from the Law Commissions or 
elsewhere) and the other matters referred to in the previous paragraph into newly-crafted text 
that tells the reader with at least some degree of certainty what the law now actually is, as 
well as (if appropriate) putting the law into its wider context, and analysing its likely effect 
and its effectiveness. It is not always possible to achieve this desirable state of certainty: in 
                                                 
21 For example, sections 197-214 of the Companies Act 2006 that relate to directors’ loans are notoriously 
impenetrable. 
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this case, the best that can be done is to present the different interpretations of the law and 
either let readers make their own minds up, wait for a test case to resolve the issue, or 
postulate what in the author’s view the law is likely to be or ought to be, or to suggest, 
usually on a practical basis, changes for the better.  
Independence of the research 
The publications referred to in this critical appraisal have been written independently. I have 
no co-authors. 
Originality 
The law on the matters referred to in this critical appraisal is already in the public domain. So 
is much of the material which is drawn upon in order to provide information for the 
commentary on the law in these books. When a new important case is decided or a new Act is 
passed there will be other legal commentators in different professional and academic journals 
making similar points to the author’s. In addition, the Government nowadays provides 
explanatory notes on any new legislation, such notes being available online as an 
accompaniment to the legislation. But what makes this critical appraisal original is that the 
law referred to herein is examined in the context of the three themes, and as will be seen in 
due course, in some respects the legislation is found wanting and better remedies could be 
made available. 
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Chapter 2 
The partial redundancy of theoretical underpinnings of corporate, bankruptcy and 
diligence law to the themes of this critical appraisal.  
Company law 
In the 1990s there was a resurgence of interest in company law theory, mainly at the instance 
of Brian Cheffins and his book, Company Law: theory, structure and operation.22 Up to that 
point, within the United Kingdom at least, little attention had been paid to theories of 
company law within legal scholarship. It is very noticeable that the main book on UK 
company law, Gower and Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law23 still does not even 
touch on any theories. The book uses the practical approach of saying what the law is, not 
referring to the theories that might have lain behind the law, working on the principle, no 
doubt, that most corporate lawyers are more interested in the practicalities of the law as it 
stands at present than in any academic theories about company law. There were, and indeed 
there still are, good reasons for this. The reasons are well summed up in Cheffins’s article, 
Using theory to study law: a company law perspective.24 In the article, Cheffins draws a 
distinction between the doctrinal study of company law and theoretical study of law. Up to 
the time of the publication of his book, the emphasis in the teaching of company law within 
universities and elsewhere was on the practicalities of the law, as shown in case law and 
legislation. There was a disinclination to lift one’s gaze to a see how the law fitted into a 
wider social or economic context. One obvious reason for this was that students were not 
generally very interested in learning what they did not need to know in order to be qualified 
as a lawyer or to practise as a corporate law. Another reason is that much of the scholarship 
on company law theory was based in the United States, and drew heavily on the study of 
economics. Not only was this not a discipline not always familiar to practising lawyers, but it 
was of little use in resolving disputes or establishing relationships between the actors within a 
company.  
While an economics-based approach to company law may indeed fail to resolve disputes or 
establish relationships, and while some of the scholarship may be divorced from the day to 
                                                 
22 The theories are well summed up in Mayson, French and Ryan on Company Law, 30th ed., OUP 2014, Ch.1 
and discussed at length in Cheffins Company Law: theory, structure and operation Ch.1. OUP, 1996 
23 Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law, 9th ed. Sweet and Maxwell 2012.   
24 1999 C.L.J., 58(1), 197-221.  He develops some of these ideas further in The trajectory of (corporate)law 
scholarship 2003 C.L.J., 2004 , 63(2), 456-506.  
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day concerns of practitioners, it does not mean that it is a bad thing to pause to reflect on the 
essential question “For whose benefit is a company being run?” Closely allied to this question 
is the normative “For whose benefit ought a company be run?” and the more practical, “Once 
we have decided for whose benefit a company ought to be run, how do we ensure that 
companies are run in this manner?” While this question might not necessary for the daily 
running of a company, it may become so for those, particularly politicians or certain lobby 
groups, hoping to shape the law in the hope that law will force companies to be run in a 
particular way.  
For a long time, the assumption of contractarian lawyers was that companies were run 
essentially to make the investors money. Investors ceded control of their money to a company 
run by directors who would use the company’s resources and the investors’ capital to 
generate good returns for the investors. Due recognition was given to the agency problem, 
which arises when directors, taking undue account of their informational advantage relative 
to the investors, run the company primarily for their own benefit. For that reason laws had to 
be framed to remind directors of their fiduciary and other duties to the company as a whole, 
and render the directors liable to dismissal by the investors, assuming the investors had 
sufficient voting power to do so; and where the investors did not have the voting power to 
enforce the directors’ fiduciary or other duties or to dismiss the directors, this would be 
reflected in the price of the shares. As regards wider interests, such as the expectation of 
being a good employer, being a good “citizen” (to the extent that an artificial entity could be 
a citizen) by paying taxes, or helping the community from which its workforce is drawn, 
these were only expectations, not obligations, and should not detract from the essential duty 
of maximising returns for the investors.25 
The advantage of this theoretical approach is that it is easy to grasp. There is an assumption 
that each actor within a company is out for the maximum of what he can get from the 
company, and that an employee, a director, a creditor should be entitled to what they may 
have bargained for but the entire residual benefit should be for the investors alone.   Unless 
any activity generates funds or provides a tangible benefit for the shareholders, or what is 
known colloquially as “ROI” (return on investment), it is not worth doing. Indeed, there is an 
conservative American organisation, the National Centre for Public Policy Research 
(“NCPPR”), whose main function is to act as a spokesman for investors who share these 
                                                 
25 This particular approach is discussed further at Part 2 in Chapter 4.  
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views.26 At the AGM of Apple in July 2014 one of its representatives objected to Apple’s 
initiatives in energy sustainability, preparing devices for the blind, environmental issues and 
worker safety, none of which were profitable. To this Apple’s CEO, Tim Cook, replied “If 
you want me to do things for ROI reasons, you should get out of this stock.”27 The Apple 
shareholders clearly agreed with Cook, for the NCPPR’s proposals only received 2.95% of 
the vote.  
History suggests that plenty of entrepreneurs never saw their duty as only to generate ever 
greater personal returns for shareholders. David Dale (and later Robert Owen), who designed 
the New Lanark cotton mills from 1786 onwards, considered that an important part of their 
enterprise’s wealth should be ploughed back into the community that generated it. They 
instituted schools and health care, accommodation and other benefits which arguably kept the 
work force healthy, loyal, and valued. Other well-known entrepreneurs in the 19th century, 
particularly Quaker families such as the Cadburys, the Frys and the Rowntrees, made 
fortunes in chocolate and used company money to improve the conditions of their workforce 
beyond what was necessary to make them carry out their work properly. These families took 
pride in being socially responsible employers and businessmen.     
The important point was that these families strongly identified with the companies that 
generated their wealth and they felt a moral duty to improve the world around them. They 
had substantial shareholdings in their family companies and incoming shareholders were 
aware of their activities; if they disapproved of such altruism they were at liberty to take their 
investment elsewhere to more lucrative and less public-spirited businesses. However, when 
shareholdings in large companies became increasingly divorced from the original and 
benevolent founders of those companies, it is not surprising that some shareholders become 
less concerned about the founders’ philanthropic issues and more interested in return on 
investment.  Even so, it does suggest that the contractarian approach of each actor being out 
for his own benefit, with the shareholders being entitled to the whole residual interest, by no 
means always describes the full picture, and the fact that at the Apple AGM so few investors 
shared that approach suggests that investors are becoming more sophisticated in their 
expectations of the benefits to be derived from being a shareholder. So to that extent this 
theory is unsatisfactory.  
                                                 
26 See their website at http://www.nationalcenter.org/ (accessed 4 Jan 2015). 
27 Forbes: http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2014/03/07/why-tim-cook-doesnt-care-about-the-bloody-
roi/ (Accessed 4 Jan 2015) 
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With the rise in the generally agreed standards of corporate governance, mostly introduced as 
a result of failures of corporate governance, it became apparent that a more inclusive theory 
of company law was required. The current view in the United Kingdom, as espoused by the 
Company Law Steering Group’s deliberations28, which resulted in s.172(1) of the Companies 
Act 2006, is that of “enlightened shareholder value” which is effectively that companies on 
the whole prosper best when all the actors take account of each other’s interests, and the 
directors, and indeed the investors, customers and employees, are mindful of the other 
stakeholders. So to the question “For whose benefit ought a company be run?” comes the 
more thoughtful, or possibly more common sense answer, “Ultimately a company should be 
run in a way that benefits the investors, but the best way to run a company, if it is to last for 
everyone’s benefit, is to run it in a way that takes account of all the stakeholders, and is not 
run purely for the short-term benefit or self-interest of the investors”.  It is not difficult to see 
that a company that produces products whose profits are very good for the employees, the 
directors, and the investors, but are poor quality for the customers, ultimately loses the 
goodwill and trust of its customers – as the major UK banks over the last few years have 
discovered – and that this in turn will affect the investors. Similarly Tesco recently 
discovered that treating its suppliers harshly is bad for the company’s share price.  
A criticism of the enlightened shareholder approach/stakeholder approach is that the 
directors, in attempting to satisfy everyone, satisfy no-one; that  by pretending to be trying to 
take account of everyone’s interest they may cast a smokescreen over their own self-interest; 
and another is that it is not directors’ role, or indeed their companies’ role, to make the world 
a better place. A further practical point is that many business organisations tend to promote 
those who make most money for the organisation, and managers, trained in a culture of 
maximising returns, may find that on achieving directorial status a different and wider set of 
values is required, one that may be unfamiliar, unwelcome or slow to be adopted. These are 
admitted drawbacks of a stakeholder approach, but it is not generally disputed any longer that 
the stakeholder approach has much to commend it. This then leads to the bigger question of 
whether directors should be forced to run their company in the required manner by 
legislation. As will be argued later, legislation has not proved a successful way to make 
companies be run in such a manner: the market is actually a more effective driver of good 
practice than legislation. What I also seek to argue is that although there is virtue in trying to 
                                                 
28 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: the Strategic Framework (London DTI, 1999), para 
5.1.12 and Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework (URN 00/656) 
(London DTI 2000) para. 2.11.  
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apply theories of company law to how companies should be run, since the theories may 
reveals insights that might not otherwise be apparent, it is important to notice that theories 
have not in practice played very much part in political decision-making. When s.172(1) of the 
Companies Act 2006 was being discussed in Westminster, only marginal attention was paid 
to any of these theories by any of the politicians who voted for it.29 That is why the research 
in this critical appraisal does not concern itself what any such theories were, or how they 
might be critiqued, but is focussed on the narrower grounds of what Parliament actually 
produced, and whether the wording (in the legislation) of what politicians approved was 
effective and achieved what the politicians intended.  
 
Theories of bankruptcy law 
As far as bankruptcy is concerned, there is a certain amount of scholarship on the principles 
of corporate insolvency, mostly based on the contractarian theory, namely that parties are free 
to contract with each other as they please, and that it is up to creditors to negotiate such 
means of minimising the risk that the debtor will become insolvent as they can manage. The 
common method of minimising risk is by persuading the debtor to grant a fixed security, 
typically a standard security (mortgage) over his property, or to obtain a personal guarantee 
from a suitable guarantor. This is all very well for creditors who are in a position to extract 
some form of security, but this is not generally available for unsecured creditors and 
particularly for involuntary creditors, not in any position to contract with their debtors. 
Unsecured creditors are treated on a pari passu basis, but the Government steps in to afford 
some protection to favoured creditors. Other principles are that bankruptcy should offer a 
“fresh start” and that bankruptcy is a social good. Since there is a possibility that all of us 
could become bankrupt through blameless misfortune or error, there should, as part of our 
common humanity to our fellow man, be a method of debt forgiveness.  At the same time 
there should be some degree of penalty for reckless bankrupts, an example being seen in 
Bankruptcy Restrictions Orders and Undertakings, introduced in the Bankruptcy and 
Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007. Bankruptcy systems are not noticeably different 
throughout the developed world. Different countries may give preferential status to different 
creditors, but overall most bankruptcy laws are not greatly different from their Roman law 
origins.  
                                                 
29 The extent to which they were discussed is dealt with in Part 2 of Chapter 4.  
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As far as bankruptcy is concerned (and indeed diligence), I have been closely involved in the 
legislative changes in this area within Scotland over the last eight years, partly as legal 
adviser to two committees within the Scottish Parliament whose job was to oversee new 
bankruptcy bills, but also as an adviser to the Accountant in Bankruptcy. In none of the 
extensive documentation surrounding these bills did I see any consideration of any theories 
pertaining to bankruptcy law: all the legislative changes were based on nothing other than the 
practical process of making the law relating to bankruptcy and diligence fairer and more 
effective than before, and acceptable to a majority of the politicians who would be voting on 
the matter. It was clear that policy-makers within the then Scottish Executive Legal 
Department and the Accountant in Bankruptcy had looked at legislation in England and 
Wales (particularly as regards Bankruptcy Restrictions Orders) reducing the period of 
sequestration to one year only for most debtors, following changes to that effect in England 
and Wales in the Insolvency Act 2002. Theory was conspicuously absent in the discussions 
that took place on these matters: what was evident was a pragmatic desire not to place 
Scottish debtors at a disadvantage to English debtors in terms of the duration of the 
bankruptcy together with a fond but not necessarily justified belief that the reduction to one 
year would encourage entrepreneurs, and a desire to protect the public by having an easily 
accessible register of debtors subject to Bankruptcy Restrictions Orders. It was more a case of 
copying what seemed to work abroad rather than applying any theory of insolvency law to 
debtors’ and creditors’ situations. On this same basis of copying what is done elsewhere, the 
Accountant in Bankruptcy is proposing to introduce debtor education as part of the 
implementation of the Bankruptcy and Debt Advice (Scotland) Act 2014. This is already 
extensively available in the United States, where under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act 2005 debtors are required to undertake some education in the hope 
that it will increase debtors’ financial literacy. Debtors need only undertake two-hour internet 
session and on payment of $10 a certificate of completion of the education is produced. 
Although the American experience of debtor rehabilitation is compromised by the fact that a 
debtor with severe health problems is likely quickly to run into financial difficulties, and so 
the American experience is not necessarily replicable in Scotland, there was no reference in 
any of the recent Accountant in Bankruptcy documentation surrounding the Bankruptcy and 
Debt Advice (Scotland) Act 2014 to any theoretical research on the value of debt education 
or how it could be carried out successfully.  
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For these reasons, this critical appraisal does not address any further theoretical 
underpinnings of bankruptcy law.  
 
Theories of law relating to diligence 
 If there was little evidence of any theoretical principles being applied to the law of 
bankruptcy within Scotland, there was even less within the law of diligence. The only 
concept approaching a principle, though not perhaps a theory, was that it should be possible 
in law for there to be a means of diligence exigible against every asset of a debtor’s. For this 
reason the then Scottish Executive legal service department drew up legislation, duly enacted 
in the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007, which would have abolished 
adjudication for debt, and replaced it with land attachment. Residual attachment would then 
be used against any other asset of the debtor’s not already subject to one of the other forms of 
diligence. These two forms of attachment were never brought into force, mainly for political 
reasons, since no politician wanted to be seen as the politician who brought forward 
legislation that caused debtors’ homes to be sold for their debts.  For this reason, theories of 
the law relating to diligence are not entertained in this critical appraisal and even if they exist, 
they were clearly redundant in this case.  
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Chapter 3 
The balance between debtor and creditor. 
Summary 
This chapter explores the balance between debtor and creditor, in the context of company law 
by reference to an important recent case, and in the context of bankruptcy and diligence by 
reference to the changes introduced by the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 
2007.  
 
Company Law and the corporate veil 
As is well known, the essential point of company law, as enshrined in the Companies Act 
2006, is that the owners of a company (its members) are generally not obliged to bear any 
responsibility for their company’s debts beyond what they have chosen to invest in the 
company. The company has a separate legal personality from its owners and managers, this 
division being commonly known as the “corporate veil”. Directors generally bear no 
responsibility for a company’s debts provided the company is solvent (and not approaching 
insolvency) and provided they are carrying out company business through their company. 
The qualification of “generally” is inserted to allow for those few occasions when liability 
may be attributed to the members or directors. 
Not only is a director not liable for the debts of his companies, but the reverse is true too. By 
placing assets into a company, he ceases to be liable for those assets and they are beyond the 
reach of his personal creditors. 
This was recently explored by the Supreme Court in the case of Prest v Petrodel Resources 
Ltd,30 discussed in the fourth edition of Company Law. It is, however, a very apt 
demonstration of the first theme of this version of the critical appraisal.31 Although this case 
is primarily a case involving maintenance payments to an ex-wife, its importance from a 
company law point of view is that the Supreme Court took the opportunity to consider when 
the corporate veil may be pierced. Prest was the controlling shareholder in some companies 
                                                 
30 [2013] 2 AC 415. 
31 Some of the  ideas and material which follows has been published in a slightly different form in Piercing the 
corporate veil: Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd,  2014 Edin. L.R. 18(2), 275-279 
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which owned various properties within London. His ex-wife wanted an order from the courts 
enforcing the transfer of the properties by those companies to her. The companies that Prest 
controlled, and which owned the seven properties, had been in existence for some years, and 
in some cases had owned the properties before Prest’s marriage. There was no suggestion that 
the companies had been set up as a method of avoiding any legal obligations, or that the 
companies were deliberately set up to evade an obligation or frustrate the operation of law, 
these being, at least in Lord Sumption’s view, the occasions when the veil should be 
pierced.32   
The Supreme Court in due course found a means of ensuring that Mrs Prest received the 
order she wanted.  This was done by the use of a deemed resulting trust under English law.  
In the process of coming to this solution to Mrs Prest’s difficulties, Lord Sumption gave the 
concept of piercing of the corporate veil a thorough examination. Lord Sumption and Lord 
Neuberger were both determined to set out for the future the law on corporate veil-piercing, 
and they have restricted it only to those occasions when a company is being used to evade a 
legal obligation or frustrate the operation of law. Other recent corporate veil cases, VTB 
Capital plc v Nutritek International Corpn.33 and Chandler v Cape plc34  show a similar 
reluctance to pierce the veil, neither of these cases coming within these grounds.35  
In order to enlighten himself upon the manner in which other jurisdictions deal with the 
problematic issue of when the veil may be lifted, Lord Neuberger looked at piercing the veil 
in the Commonwealth and in the USA.36 Defeated by the absence of consensus on when veil-
piercing was permissible, he decided that it was almost impossible to specify exactly when 
the corporate veil should be pierced, and that perhaps the whole concept should be 
abandoned.37 He then conceded that, given the weight of previous cases, Lord Sumption’s 
                                                 
32 Per Lord Sumption at 36. 
33 [2013] UKSC 5, [2013] 2 WLR 398. 
34 [2012] 1 WLR 3111. 
35 It is interesting, however, that in the recent case of Cramaso LLP v Viscount Reidhaven’s Trustees, (UK 
Supreme Court, 11 February 2014), the trustees tried to maintain that they could not be held liable for a 
statement made about the benefits of a lease of a grouse moor when the person to whom the statement was made 
was not the corporate body that ultimately leased the moor. The person to whom the statement was made used a 
limited liability partnership (of which he was a member) to take a lease of the moor.  The statement turned out 
to be inaccurate.  The Supreme Court did not accept the trustees’ view, and held that it was foreseeable that the 
individual to whom the statement was made might not necessarily choose to take a lease of the moor in his own 
name but might instead use a corporate body in whose name the lease ultimately might be taken.  Most cases of 
veil-piercing are to make a director or member liable for something that he is trying to avoid by using a 
corporate body. Here the veil is being “parted” (for want of a better word) to allow a benefit to a member to be 
attributed to his limited liability partnership.  
36 Prest, per Lord Neuberger at paras.75 to 78. 
37 Per Lord Neuberger at 79. 
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limited formula, of piercing the veil only where there was evasion of a legal obligation or the 
frustration of the operation of the law, was probably acceptable38 – except where Parliament 
specifically allowed for it in statute.39  
An example of evasion of a legal obligation or frustration of the operation of law in Lord 
Sumption’s eyes40 was Gilford Motor Co. Ltd v Horne.41 However, many other past veil-
piercing cases, in Lord Sumption’s view, do not, strictly speaking, involve veil-piercing, but 
either are examples of concealment or occasions when some other legal method of resolving 
the matter, rather than veil-piercing, would achieve the proper result. In Trustor A.B. v 
Smallbone,42 for example, Lord Sumption said although this case came to an acceptable 
result, it was not a case where veil-piercing should have taken place. The proper remedy was 
that as the company was concealing the funds as agent or nominee for the director it was (in 
English law) a knowing recipient of the funds.43 Where there is fraud, the presence of an 
intermediary company ostensibly committing the fraud is irrelevant, as the better remedy is 
against the fraudster with whom the company may be jointly and severally liable. This is 
because fraud never leaves the fraudster - as indicated in Standard Chartered Bank v 
Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, (No.2) 44  by Lord Rodger’s pithy words: Culpa 
tenet suos auctores.45   
Overall, to use Lord Sumption’s own words, “There is a limited principle of English law 
which applies when a person is under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject to an 
existing legal restriction which he deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately 
frustrates by interposing a company under his control. The court may then pierce the 
corporate veil for the purpose, and only for the purpose, of depriving the company or its 
controller of the advantage that they would otherwise have obtained by the company's 
separate legal personality. The principle is properly described as a limited one, because in 
almost every case where the test is satisfied, the facts will in practice disclose a legal 
                                                 
38 Per Lord Neuberger at para.81. 
39 As for example, Insolvency Act 1986 s.43, and Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.37. 
40 Or so he says at para.29. Ironically, Lord Neuberger does not seem to share Lord Sumption’s view of this 
case, as may be seen at paras. 69-72 where Lord Neuberger seems to suggest that this case could have been 
decided by reference to agency rather than piercing the veil. 
41 [1933] Ch. 935. 
42 [2001] 3 All E.R. 987. 
43 In a sense, it makes no difference whether the funds were being hidden in a company or in any other agent’s 
bank account: whoever had the funds was required to return the funds to the true owner.  
44 [2002] 3 W.L.R. 1547. 
45 This succinct phrase is not easily rendered into English. Not only does it mean that someone who does 
something improper cannot pass the blame or liability onto his subordinates, but it also means that the 
responsibility for an improper act attaches to or remains with the person who arranged it.  
25 
 
relationship between the company and its controller which will make it unnecessary to pierce 
the corporate veil. Like Munby J in Ben Hashem,46 I consider that if it is not necessary to 
pierce the corporate veil, it is not appropriate to do so, because on that footing there is no 
public policy imperative which justifies that course.”47 
All the Justices of the Supreme Court agreed with Lord Sumption’s point in the paragraph 
above. Their reasons for doing so may not have been entirely consistent, Lord Neuberger in 
particular being at variance with Lord Sumption as to when exactly concealment took place. 
However, the overall point from the point of view of the first theme of this critical appraisal 
is that the corporate veil is not to be lightly pierced and where it is pierced it should be on the 
two grounds indicated. Outside those two grounds some other method of establishing liability 
must be found. It is of course a great deal easier to pierce the veil where both the company 
and the individuals are easily identified, (perhaps by being single member companies), and 
when it is possible to see the company being controlled by the individual concerned in an 
effort to avoid the individual’s obligations.  
Where there is a difficulty (in terms of the first theme) with this decision is that if a company 
is large enough, and there is enough diffusion of responsibility for its actions amongst 
subordinate employees, where a company is used to evade a responsibility or to frustrate 
some enforcement of the law, provided the directors are not seen to be controlling such 
activity, or preferably not even knowing about it, the two permissible veil-piercing grounds 
might in theory apply, but while the victim may have grounds for relief against the company 
(assuming it is still solvent), he may have trouble proving that there was a controlling 
shareholder making the company evade a legal responsibility or frustrate the operation of 
law. In a small company controlled by one person there would be no difficulty as the evasion 
or frustrating can be clearly identified as coming from that person. In a large company this is 
another matter.  
What is left unaddressed, not least because it would not have had any bearing on the Prest 
decision, is how wide the terms “evasion of legal responsibility to which a person may be 
subject” and “frustration of the operation of law” should be. Is this only restricted to 
relatively small scale operations, such as in Gilford, when an artful individual or a holding 
company interposes a (subsidiary) company as a way of getting round some (perhaps 
                                                 
46 Ben Hashem v Al Shayif  [2009] 1 FLR 115. 
47 Prest, per Lord Sumption at 35.  
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contractual or delictual) obligation which he or the holding company knows perfectly he or it 
should be fulfilling? The answer to this seems to be “Yes”, in which case the opportunities 
for veil-piercing are thin indeed. In particular, veil-piercing would not appear to be available 
as an option when dealing with directorial or controlling shareholder involvement in breaches 
by their companies of regulatory law. As will be discussed in Part 2 of Chapter 4, it is 
surprising that directors of controlling organisations where questionable activities are taking 
place remain, so far, free from liability for the activities over which they will have presided 
and known about in general, if not necessarily in detail. It also seems inequitable that a 
holding company, having enjoyed the profits of a subsidiary, can close the subsidiary down 
without responsibility for any wider consequences of that closure.  
Conversely, if directors or controlling shareholders are liable to customers for every dubious 
action of that company, no-one would wish to become a director or controlling shareholder of 
a company and business would go to other more business-friendly jurisdictions. There is no 
solution to this conundrum. Lord Neuberger was understandably perplexed.  There is no 
satisfactory balance to be found between the company as debtor and its creditors, and no 
perfect formula for veil-piercing. As far as companies are concerned, the balance is now 
firmly in favour of the debtor (the company). Our law has made an artificial construct, the 
limited company, and given it an advantage relative to other methods of running a business. 
This is the price for the promotion of trade within the United Kingdom. The greater good to 
society from having limited companies and the opportunities for commerce that they bring 
outweigh the occasional unfairness in individual circumstances.  
Furthermore, whether or not one agrees with the Justices of the Supreme Court, what they 
have stated now becomes the law until such time as they revisit their own decision.  
Bankruptcy Law and Diligence 
Part of the intention of the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) 2007 Act was to 
improve the law relating to bankruptcy and to enable debtors to apply to the Accountant in 
Bankruptcy for their own sequestration. The Act also made some changes to Debt 
Arrangement Programmes. It tidied up the law relating to diligence on the dependence and 
tried to extend the principle of the applicability of diligence to all assets of a debtor.  
Reduction of bankruptcy to a period of one year 
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This part reduced the period of bankruptcy from three years to one year, save where the 
debtor has not co-operated with the trustee in sequestration.48 The period was reduced to one 
year because that is the period in England and Wales. It is one year in England and Wales 
allegedly because the then Minister for Trade, Peter Mandelson, was in Texas and discovered 
that the period of bankruptcy there is one year. Mandelson was allegedly impressed by this on 
the grounds that a reduced period of bankruptcy would encourage the promotion of new 
businesses. The Enterprise Act 2002 therefore allowed for one year bankruptcy in England 
and Wales.49 As stated in the previous chapter, there is no evidence to establish whether or 
not the reduced period of bankruptcy has made any difference to entrepreneurs or to their 
enthusiasm to start again in business. The UK is nevertheless a debtor-friendly country 
compared to Germany, where debtors remain as bankrupts for up to six years. The balance in 
this country has certainly been tipped in favour of the debtor.  
 
Bankruptcy restrictions orders and undertakings50 
These have also been introduced from England and Wales and may be imposed by the sheriff 
to prevent the debtor carrying out various activities, such as being a company director, 
borrowing certain sums of money or holding public office for a period of time. Debtors may 
apply for their own undertakings, usually for a lesser period of time. The AiB now maintains 
a list of debtors subject to these orders and undertakings.51 Breach of the order or undertaking 
gives rise to criminal sanctions. Being on the AiB’s list enables members of the public to find 
out useful information about the debtor and the AiB’s website regularly reports occasions 
when debtors have been caught breaching their orders or undertakings. Although it is not 
perfect, it provides a degree of protection for creditors against unscrupulous debtors.  
 
Debtor applications 
These have already been mentioned and allow debtors to apply for their own sequestration 
from the Accountant in Bankruptcy instead of from a sheriff.52 The current three methods of 
                                                 
48 2007 Act s.1.  
49 At s.256. 
50 2007 Act s.2 
51 See http://www.aib.gov.uk/About/annualtargets/BROBRU/bankruptcyrestrict 
52 2007 Act s.14. 
28 
 
application, these being the standard one, the Low Income Low Asset application, and the 
Certificated application now make it relatively easy for debtor to apply on line for their own 
awards of sequestration, though ironically the £200 application fee still deters some debtors 
and there have been occasions when debtors have had to apply to charities to obtain the £200 
needed to apply for their own sequestration.53 But in principle, this has been beneficial for the 
indigent, and enabled debtors to be freed from the burden of debts they could never pay.54 
The recent changes in the Bankruptcy and Debt Advice (Scotland) Act 2014 with the 
Minimal Assets Procedure will make it even easier for debtors to apply for their own 
bankruptcy. The balance here has undoubtedly been tipped in favour of the debtor.   
 
Various reforms to the debtor’s position 
The 2007 Act provided for various means of ensuring that if debtors were earning an income, 
some of their income could be applied towards their creditors, one of these means being 
debtors’ employers deducting a portion of the debtors’ wages and paying them to the trustee 
for the benefit of the creditors. However, it did not go far enough. The Bankruptcy and Debt 
Advice (Scotland) Act 2014 is to introduce a standardised means of assessing the extent of a 
debtor’s contribution to his creditors out of his income. This is known as the common 
financial tool.55 Standardisation of debtors’ contributions should benefit debtors and creditors 
alike. The provision of debt advice to anyone considering sequestration should, ideally, at 
least improve debtors’ understanding of the significance of sequestration or other means of 
repaying creditors56: this too should benefit both debtors and indirectly creditors, as should (if 
it is carried out properly) financial education for the debtor.57  
Protecting the innocent purchaser from the consequences of his ignorance of a debtor’s 
sequestration  
One of the more enlightened matters introduced to the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 by 
the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007 were the new provisions in s.32(9ZA) 
which were expressly designed to protect a person purchasing property from a debtor at a 
                                                 
53 Private information from Penicuik Citizens Advice Bureau, May 2013. 
54 A further method, the minimal assets process, is proposed in the Bankruptcy and Debt Advice (Scotland) Bill 
at present before the Scottish Parliament.  
55 See Bankruptcy and Debt Advice (Scotland) Act 2014 s.3.  
56 S.1. 
57 S.2 
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time when the debtor was newly sequestrated but the purchaser was genuinely  unaware of 
this, and had in good faith paid money to the debtor for the property – but the debtor had not 
delivered the disposition in favour of the purchaser before the sequestration took effect. 
Historically this would have been unfortunate for the purchaser. He would have lost both his 
money and his chance of the property, and the trustee in sequestration would have received 
the windfall of payment for the property while being able to retain the property. The 
purchaser might have had a remedy against his solicitor or searchers in the Register of 
Inhibitions and Adjudications. A legal remedy is all very well, but most purchasers would 
rather have the house that they wanted than a right to sue their solicitor. Scots law introduced 
an exception to the normal pari passu rule by saying that under these exceptional 
circumstances the purchaser has a limited window of opportunity within which to register his 
deed at the Land Register.  Although, as far as is known, there has been no occasion when 
this sections has had to used, it is nevertheless a striking example of repairing the balance 
between debtor and creditor, in this case in the creditor’s favour.    
 
Land attachment 
This was possibly the most contentious part of the 2007 Act but it has yet to be brought into 
force and possibly never will be brought into force. Part 4 of the 2007 Act was intended to 
replace adjudication for debt, and to provide a remedy for a creditor to force the sale of 
heritable property owned by a debtor. A similar process exists in England, known as a 
charging order, and there are similar processes in most other countries. The process in 
Scotland was carefully worked out by the Parliamentary draftsman, with multiple 
opportunities for the debtor to object to any hardship or procedural flaw in the process, but 
once the SNP were in power in the Scottish Parliament, the then First Minister refused to 
bring Part 4 of the 2007 Act into force. Nominally this was because, as drafted, the Act 
allowed a creditor to carry out land attachment for as little as £3,000 and it had the effect of 
converting an unsecured debt into an unsecured debt. This was seen as fundamentally unfair. 
He was also not willing to let land attachment be used against a debtor’s own home, since 
that might potentially increase homelessness.58 It is possible that the First Minister did not 
wish to implement, and therefore be responsible for, a new form of diligence that might 
                                                 
58 See the First Minister’s speech to the Citizens Advice Scotland Conference, 15 August 2007, available at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Speeches/Speeches/smarter/CABx  
30 
 
conceivably be used against his own party’s supporters. Land attachment remains 
unimplemented and there have been no recent suggestions that the matter is to be revisited. A 
creditor who wishes to extract payment from a heritage-owning debtor must at present use the 
diligence of adjudication for debt. His alternative is to sequestrate the debtor which not only 
can have serious effects upon the debtor’s family and indeed the debtor’s business or 
employees, but may be more than the creditor wishes to achieve. What could have been a 
creditor-friendly move was rejected at a political level, though it might not have been 
impossible to restrict the use of land attachment to commercial property or second homes, or 
property owned by bodies other than natural persons. 
Residual attachment 
As land attachment was not brought into force, residual attachment could not be brought into 
force either. It was not wholly clear to what it would apply, other than to any property not 
subject to any other type of diligence. It is suggested that it might have applied to property 
such as the right of a landowner to grant fishing permits to those fishing on his water, or the 
right to charge admission to a country house. But as it looks unlikely to be brought into force, 
it is unlikely that the law will be tested to see what it does cover. 
Debt arrangement programmes (“DAPs”) 
S.211 of the 2007 Act allowed the Scottish Ministers to make further regulations about 
DAPs. DAPs are means whereby a debtor, with the help of a money adviser, can set up a 
programme whereby a portion of his income is applied to a payments distributor who then 
makes payments to his various creditors, all as set out in the DAP devised by the money 
adviser. Creditors are informed of the proposed DAP and unless the required percentage 
positively object within a limited time, the DAP is deemed to be accepted by the creditors. 
Most creditors are relieved when they hear that a debtor is in a DAP because their chances of 
being repaid are usually much improved. Entering into a DAP prevents further diligence 
being carried out against the debtor and prevents him being sequestrated (assuming the 
payments are kept up). The regulations referred to above allowed interest and charges to be 
written off from the date of the application to the creditors. They also allow payment holidays 
and breaks if the debtor is severely ill or unemployed. The take-up of DAPs has been very 
patchy throughout Scotland, some areas, noticeably Lanarkshire, having quite large numbers, 
and others very few. To some extent the take-up depends on the availability of money 
advisers. It also depends on the debtors having enough disposable income or a secure job to 
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enable them to enter into the DAP. DAPs seem to be suitable for debtors who are employed 
but are not good at managing their money and need help in looking after their financial 
affairs. The changes referred to above make DAPs very much more attractive to debtors, and 
in practice creditors are relieved that someone is ensuring that the debtor is paying something 
towards his outstanding debts. 
Diligence on the dependence 
The 2007 Act introduced various changes to the law of diligence on the dependence, in 
particular giving debtors much greater rights to object to diligence on the dependence. In the 
case of arrestments of non-corporate debtors’ bank accounts, the first £415 is unarrestable, 59 
and there are restrictions on the amount that may be arrested. It is for the creditor to prove 
that diligence on the dependence is necessary and should remain in place, if a challenge is 
mounted to it. Although the legislation is helpful to creditors in that it is put on a clear 
statutory basis rather than the previous common law, safeguards have been put in place to 
prevent its oppressive use.   
 The overall extent to which the 2007 Act affects the balance between creditors and debtors 
The 2007 Act undoubtedly brought in some improvements for debtors. They can certainly 
more easily apply for their own sequestration and be relieved of their debts than was the case 
before. The rules for arrestment and inhibition have been clarified as have the rules for 
arrestment and inhibition on the dependence, and interim attachment. Whether or not those 
rules are better than they were before, they are certainly easier to find and they are broadly 
consistent with each other. There are many provisions to protect debtors from rapacious 
creditors, such as the ability of the sheriff to suspend diligence where it would be “unduly 
harsh” The balance does now favour the debtor more than it used to, and the legislation has 
achieved this by implementing a number of small but workable changes. The main exception 
to this is money attachment, which, although providing many opportunities for debtors or 
others to have their interests taken account of, is a further weapon in the armoury of creditors, 
and not one that existed before. However, as explained in the previous chapter, it is not a 
noticeably effective diligence and is easily evaded.   
                                                 
59 Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987, s.73F. The benefit of this provision is somewhat reduced by the reality that most 
human debtors subject to arrestment have no money in their bank accounts anyway.  
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Had land attachment and residual attachment been brought into force, they would have added 
to the creditors’ armoury, and consequentially reduced the range of assets that could not be 
handed over to a creditor. As land attachment has not been brought into force, it is not 
possible to know by how much creditors’ positions would have improved; instead their 
alternatives remain inhibition, adjudication or sequestration. 
 
Conclusion 
In an Utopian world, creditors and debtors would have equal rights, neither would wish to 
take advantage of the other and there would be no opportunity to do so. The changes to the 
law within the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007 suggest that at least within 
the Scottish Parliament’s eyes, the balance in respect of much bankruptcy legislation and the 
law of diligence was not as fair to the debtor as it might be. While easing the burden in some 
respects for debtors, the original intention was that nearly all of a debtor’s overall assets 
could have been subject to diligence, and in particular their heritage or any other assets which 
could have been subject to residuary diligence. For political reasons, and perhaps mindful of 
debtors’ interests, this intention was not fulfilled. The balance is more tipped in favour of the 
debtor than it was. 
 
In company law, the Prest case tips the balance in favour of the company at the expense of 
the creditor. This has always been the case, and is the key point of limited liability – but this 
case makes it harder than it might have been previously for creditors to have a right of relief 
against the owners of companies except under the two limited circumstances outlined 
previously. While it is possible that this may lead to some degree of irresponsibility by 
company owners, the Supreme Court appears willing to trade that risk with the overall benefit 
to the economy of allowing limited liability to be as limited as it is.  
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Chapter 4 
The use of the law to alter business and social behaviour  
The tension between the intention of the legislation and the actuality 
 
Summary  
This chapter discusses the two above themes, which as noted in the Introduction, have some 
degree of overlap, first in the context of bankrupty and diligence, and then, in much greater 
length in Part 2 in the context of company law and of directors’ duties in particular. Section 
172 of the Companies Act 2006 was introduced to try to influence directors’ behaviour. The 
evidence is that despite what directors said they were doing, they were not paying any 
attention to the Government’s wishes. The legislation was misunderstood by politicians, 
flawed and unrealistic. A better alternative drawn from Irish legislation is suggested instead.   
Part 1. 
Bankruptcy  
As has been previously explained, historically bankruptcy in Scotland was only suitable for 
merchants and landowners.60 The cost was high and an order for sequestration could only be 
obtained from the sheriff court or the Court of Session. The Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2007 made a significant change, allowing debtors to apply directly to the 
Accountant in Bankruptcy provided they came within certain parameters as to the extent of 
their indebtedness and their assets and provided they had not been sequestrated within the 
previous five years. Since 2007 there have been changes to the legislation to make it 
progressively easier for debtors to apply for their own sequestration. 
The rationale behind making sequestration easier to obtain was because it was apparent that 
debtors were in an invidious position. It was not generally worth a creditor’s while 
sequestrating a debtor, The only alternative was to execute diligence against the debtor, 
assuming he had any assets or earnings against which to carry out diligence. If the debtor had 
no such assets or earnings, the creditor either wrote off the debt, sold the debt, or continued to 
                                                 
60 For a review of the law of bankruptcy in Scotland, see Grier Bankruptcy Law in Scotland: past, present and 
future 2014 Scottish Parliamentary Review 25.  
34 
 
pester the debtor until the debtor, in desperation, paid up. Many debtors were experiencing 
anxiety and ill –health as a result of pressure from their creditors.  
The main creditors were finance companies and local authorities trying to obtain arrears of 
council tax. During the late 1980s and early 200s credit became much more easily available 
and debtors took advantage of this, not always wisely. As for council tax arrears, the local 
authorities were in a difficult position. They needed the money to pay for the social services 
provided by the authorities, but council tax was and still is an unpopular tax, not always 
supported by the authorities’ own councillors. Local authorities could not afford to be seen as 
a “soft touch” by debtors unwilling to pay the council tax, but equally it was politically 
unacceptable to be too draconian in trying to extract payment from clearly indigent debtors. 
Relaxing the rules on sequestration, to make it easier for debtors to be relieved of their debts, 
provided a face-saving solution for local authorities. It might also make finance companies 
marginally more cautious in supplying credit. It has enabled debtors to apply successfully for 
their own sequestration and provided relief where relief was not available before. 
In 2007 it was hoped that the greater ease of sequestration would mean that it would become 
less socially unacceptable to be made bankrupt and that the stigma of bankruptcy would be 
removed. There does not appear to have been any research on social attitudes to the perceived 
stigma of bankruptcy and it is therefore difficult to know to what extent the stigma has been 
removed. Realistically it is unlikely to be removed entirely even when the bankruptcy is not 
the debtor’s own fault. Few parents nowadays, even after attempts to destigmatise 
bankruptcy, would be entirely comfortable if their only child sought to be marry a bankrupt. 
It was also originally thought that reducing the period of sequestration to one year rather than 
the three years it had been previously would have the effect of encouraging entrepreneurial 
activity within Scotland. Again, there does not appear to be any research to have established 
whether or not the reduction to one year made any difference at all. What was apparent was 
that if in England and Wales bankruptcy only lasts one year, it would be anomalous if 
Scotland had a longer period. If the law was being used to alter business and social 
behaviour, its efficacy is not evident.   
The introduction of bankruptcy restrictions orders and undertakings was done explicitly to 
protect the public and to persuade debtors to behave better. It is difficult to establish whether 
or not the latter laudable aim has been achieved. It would appear likely that it will have a 
positive effect on the more responsible debtors. Debtors are, however, not always very 
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responsible. By way of comparison, Craig Whyte, the erstwhile owner of Rangers Football 
Club, had previously received a company director’s disqualification order of seven years’ 
duration. It clearly did not prevent him indulging in the sort of activities that caused him to be 
given a further 15 year disqualification.  
Diligence 
In an ideal world, creditors would not need to use diligence as debtors would pay their bills 
on time. The reality is otherwise. Debtors do not always pay their debts. Diligence exists to 
make debtors realise that debts do have to be paid. Drafting the law on diligence is 
particularly complex as the law must both allow the creditor the right to be repaid by seizing 
some assets or earnings of the debtor, but it must not be done in such a way that it is 
oppressive and unfair on the debtor. But the more opportunities that are given to the debtor to 
frustrate, delay or prevent the creditor obtaining payment, the more costly the process is, and 
that cost is then factored into the cost of a loan or the availability of a loan, or the provision 
of goods or services to the debtor. The debtor ultimately will have to bear the costs of the 
process.  
A further difficulty is that the law has to finds a means of enforcing payment from the “won’t 
pay” debtor as well as being merciful to the “can’t pay” debtor. The aim behind extending 
diligence to all assets of a debtor’s, including land, was to catch the “won’t pay” debtor who 
has heritable assets. A hypothetical example would be that of an indebted and alarming 
gangster who is sufficiently threatening that sheriff officers are unwilling to carry out an 
attachment of moveable property at his home. By carrying out land attachment (had it ever 
been implemented) the gangster would ultimately have lost ownership of his house and his 
creditors might have been repaid. While there is clearly merit in extracting payment from 
debtors who own heritable property and could pay their debts but refuse to do so, the price for 
the introduction of land attachment would be the possibility that it could be used oppressively 
against debtors who have nowhere else to live and no means of repaying their debt. In those 
circumstances the creditors have the option of sequestrating a debtor or inhibiting him, the 
latter usually being effective at some stage.  
As was previously indicated, land attachment never was brought into force, mainly for 
political reasons, but also because it had the effect of turning an unsecured debt into a secured 
one. Notwithstanding that most countries have a method of forcing sales of debtor’s property, 
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it was decided not to implement land attachment and leave creditors to the slower remedies of 
adjudication for debt, inhibition, or sequestration (or liquidation for companies).  
As for the other new type of diligence that was introduced by the Bankruptcy and Diligence 
etc. (Scotland) Act 2007, money attachment, it has been already been mentioned that while 
the process can operate in terms of the legislation, in practice it is not very effective as 
debtors no longer keep cash in places such as tills where sheriff officers can seize the money. 
Anecdotally what appears in practice to be more effective is the presence of sheriff officers 
using any form of attachment in, say, a debtor’s shop, causing the shop-owner extreme 
embarrassment and causing customers to go to other, more reliable, businesses for their 
purchases.     
 
Part 2 
Company law  
This part analyses in detail s.172(1) of the Companies Act, 2006. Since the most recent 
edition of Company Law was written, there has been the opportunity to see to what extent 
s.172 has actually been used in practice. In order to review the effect of this section within 
the Act, it is necessary to consider the background to it.61   
During the 1990s the then Department of Trade and Industry set up a Company Law Steering 
Group to look critically at many aspects of company law, at the time regulated under the 
Companies Act 1985. After much deliberation it produced Modern Company Law for a 
competitive economy – the Final Report.62 This Report took evidence from a wide range of 
interests and experts on how to improve company law. Existing company law was seen to be 
full of unnecessary rules, to be confusing for company directors, and not wholly conducive to 
the setting up of businesses or retaining businesses in the UK. The Companies Act 2006 
eventually was developed from this Report. The opportunity was taken to enshrine in statute 
various European company law requirements63 and to tidy up the law relating to capital 
maintenance. Many other uncontroversial, sensible and worthwhile reforms were made to the 
process of incorporating companies, managing them, and removing them from existence. 
                                                 
61 What follows forms much of my article, Enlightened shareholder value: did directors deliver? 2014 Juridical 
Review 85.  
62 Published by the DTI in July 2001 
63 In particular the EC Thirteenth Company Law Directive on Takeover Bids (2004/25). 
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However, there were some controversial parts, and one that was at the time possibly the most 
controversial finally emerged as section 172(1), shown below.  
 
Duty to promote the success of the company 
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most 
likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in 
doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to—  
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,  
(b) the interests of the company's employees,  
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and 
others,  
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment,  
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of 
business conduct, and  
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.  
 
This sought to move the law away from the classic view that the paramount concern of 
directors was to maintain shareholder value: the directors were not obliged to take anything 
else into account except insofar as it benefitted the company and thereby indirectly the 
shareholders. In short, directors were not expected in their management of the company to 
display any particular sense of social responsibility: that might be a job for politicians but 
was not the job of directors. The best known exposition of this approach was put forward by 
the economist, Milton Friedman.64 In his view anything other than making profits was 
effectively a tax on shareholders. Such a view was not held by the advancers of the CA 2006 
s.172(1) who took the wider view that although directors should act in a way that benefits the 
shareholders, they should in the process positively take account of other stakeholders in the 
                                                 
64 “There is one and only one social responsibility of business–to use its resources and engage in activities 
designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open 
and free competition without deception or fraud.”  New York Times, 13 September 1970.  
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company, and should act in a thoughtful, inclusive way, looking to the future, considering the 
implications of their decisions for their customers, creditors, employees, the local 
neighbourhood, shareholders generally (as opposed to any favoured group of shareholders) 
and establishing a reputation for “high standards of business conduct”.  The essential duty of 
the directors was to promote the success of the company and in the process to “have regard” 
to these various requirements. This was said to lead to “enlightened shareholder value” on the 
grounds that directors who did this in the long run would create favourable conditions for the 
long-term prosperity of the company itself, its shareholders and its employees.65  
Controversial wording 
Section 172(1) attracted controversy for various reasons, mainly because from a lawyer’s 
point of view it is vague and confusing. It is not clear how much regarding is necessary, or 
how regarding needs to be evidenced. The legislation does not explain if it is necessary 
specifically to have regard to each item in turn and to have noted it down in board minutes. 
The list of matters to which the directors should have regard does not indicate what should 
happen if regarding one matter causes problems for another matter. The words “promote the 
success” of the company are not explained, nor is there any indication as to who decides what 
is meant by “success”. 
The Government indicated that the regarding should not be a mere box-ticking exercise66 and 
that directors should genuinely try to engage with the requirements of the legislation; it is 
clear that the choice of the words “have regard” was deliberate.67 Regarding is also 
something more easily carried out in a large company by a large board of directors with a 
company secretary. It is less likely to be carried out, if at all, by a small unaudited company 
with one or two shareholders. In practice, at least in a large company where corporate 
governance is taken seriously, the minutes of board meetings will record the fact that 
directors duly took account of the requirements of s.172(1). If there is any particularly 
contentious matter that would have a significant impact on any of the matters in s.172(1) the 
minutes will generally go into more detail to prove that the directors genuinely did have 
regard to that matter and did not arbitrarily make their decision without proper consideration. 
The point is that directors should have been seen to have at least had “regard” to the matter, 
even if in fact they made a decision that was detrimental to the particular matter under 
                                                 
65 See Lord Sainsbury of Turville’s speech in the House of Lords on 11 Jan 2006 HL Col.244.   
66 Se Lord Sainsbury above at Col. 245.  
67 See Alastair Darling’s speech in the House of Commons at Hansard, HC Vol. 447, col.125 (June 6, 2006). 
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consideration. It would appear that provided that there is a paper trail to show that the matters 
have been thought about, that would be evidence enough to a court or to a liquidator that the 
directors had been carrying out their task properly. The problem with the phrase “have 
regard” would appear to lie in the fact that it meant one thing to politicians and another to 
lawyers. It is a phrase that can accommodate a wide range of meanings depending on what 
one wants it to mean. Such a phrase is not ideal in legislation. 
The duty owed to the company 
The obligation to “have regard” to the various matters in s.172(1) is a duty owed by the 
directors – but a duty that is not owed to, say, the environment or the employees, but, as 
specified in s.171, only to the company. This means that a representative of the environment 
(a local councillor, perhaps) or an employee affected by a decision of the directors, has no 
standing under s.172(1) under which to sue the directors. Only the company, the collective 
body of shareholders, (or a member exercising a derivative claim on behalf of the company) 
may exercise the sanction of suing the directors for the directors’ failure to “have regard” to 
those matters. This would presuppose that the collective body of shareholders (who might, in 
any case, be the same people as the directors) feels sufficiently strongly about the matter to 
bring an action against the directors for the directors’ failure to have regard to the 
environment or the employees.  
A graver threat to the directors is that if the company went into liquidation, the liquidator 
would then represent the collective body of shareholders, and could investigate the then 
directors’ decision-making by reference to past minutes, and if necessary, take action against 
the directors for their failure to “have regard” to any of the matters in s.172(1).68 The failure 
to have regard could also be seen as misfeasance under s.212 of the Insolvency Act 1986.  
Another threat to directors who have been failing to “have regard” is when the existing 
shareholders, or a majority thereof, sell their shares to a purchaser who then has control of the 
company. The purchaser might choose to examine the company’s past board minutes and see 
the extent to which the directors had failed to “have regard”. If the directors had taken some 
contentious decisions, and there was no evidence that in doing so they had had regard to the 
matters in s.172(1), it might be open to the purchaser, now representing the company, to raise 
an action against the directors for breach of their duty.  
                                                 
68 It may also be open to the liquidator to use the provisions of s.172(3) against directors who under common 
law had failed to consider the interests of creditors when the directors could see the company was in financial 
difficulties: Re HLC Environmental Projects Ltd, [2013] EWHC 2876 (Ch). 
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This approach (that in principle only the company could sue the directors for their failure to 
take account the requirements of s.172(1)) was based on Companies Act 1985 s.309 which 
used the same principle. This was introduced into the Companies Act 1980 by the then 
Conservative government.  While Professor Davies in Gower and Davies Principles of 
Modern Company Law69 asserts that it was not clear whether the draftsmen of s.309 were 
adopting a pluralist approach (i.e. employees in their own right are a specific matter of 
consideration by directors, separate from the directors’ concern for shareholders) or an 
enlightened shareholder value approach (i.e. that employees were a matter, but one of many 
others, that should be considered in terms of what was best for shareholders), it is suggested, 
though it cannot be unequivocably established, that the ambiguity of s.309 was deliberate. As 
part of the UK’s entry to the EEC, now European Union, in 1973 there was an expectation 
that UK company legislation should give recognition to workers’ rights70, a view supported 
by some in Europe but not a view always held by directors within the UK. The UK 
Government, at that time under a Conservative administration, produced a form of wording 
for s.309 which looked as though directors had to consider workers’ interests (thus apparently 
satisfying the EU requirements) but the requirement to do so was actually a duty owed to the 
company, not to the workers themselves (thus not actually fettering directors’ capacity to 
manage their companies).71  In practice, this rendered the section almost worthless, as may 
possibly have been intended. Unless the employees formed a majority of the shareholders, 
there would be little occasion for the shareholders to exercise their rights under s.309. Despite 
the fact that s.309 was toothless, when the time came to reform the law for the CA 2006, the 
then Government (by this stage under Labour control) chose to use the same principle for 
s.172(1).  
The predicament for Parliament  
The decision to limit the extent of directors’ responsibility to having “regard”, and for only 
the company to be able to enforce this duty, was taken in the knowledge that anything more 
                                                 
69 At 16.33 
70 Employee participation and company structure in the European Community. COM (75) 570 final, 12 
November 1975. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 8/75 
71 The wording of s.309 was as follows: 
(1) The matters to which the directors of a company are to have regard in the performance of their 
functions include the interests of the company's employees in general, as well as the interests of its members. 
(2) Accordingly, the duty imposed by this section on the directors is owed by them to the company (and 
the company alone) and is enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary duty owed to a company by its 
directors. 
(3) This section applies to shadow directors as it does to directors. 
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onerous could be seen as a positive deterrent to entrepreneurs setting up companies in the UK 
or existing businesses staying in the UK. If any stakeholder, as opposed to the company, 
could sue the directors for the directors’ failure to have regard to the stakeholder’s interests, 
few directors of companies would wish to keep their businesses in the UK. This was a good 
reason for not extending rights to the stakeholders themselves.72 It is also possible, but 
probably impossible to establish, that the restricting to the company of the right to sue 
directors for breach of their duty to have regard to the various matters in s.172(1) was a legal 
point not wholly comprehended by all MPs at Westminster. Owing a duty to a company to 
promote the success of a company by having regard to various matters is a complex concept 
for those not versed in company law. However, it gives the superficial impression that 
stakeholders’ interests will at least be considered, or ought to be considered by the directors, 
and that there is a sanction for non-performance by the directors.  
As already indicated, the sanction for non-compliance, an action by the company against the 
directors, is very unlikely to take place unless the general body of shareholders is 
uncharacteristically selfless. The fact that its previous iteration in s.309 of the Companies Act 
1985 had not obviously proved effectual in safeguarding employee interests did not prevent 
its use in s.172(1). It is as if the politicians promoting it touchingly thought that this time it 
might work – or perhaps no-one could think of any better solution to the incompatible 
objectives of politicians’ not wishing to stifle directors’ desire to manage their companies 
without too much hindrance from the law, and politicians’ desire to make directors take 
account of wider social interests when managing their companies. Although there were 
attempts to clarify the meaning of the section by amendment at the time that it was being 
voted upon by the House of Commons, the amendment was withdrawn to avoid a potential 
later battle within the House of Lords, with Margaret Hodge giving a spirited defence of the 
existing wording, confident that it would achieve its intended purpose. The wording was duly 
approved without further discussion and with a comfortable majority.73  
The extent to which s.172(1) has been discussed in the courts 
                                                 
72 At the time of the House of Commons second reading discussion on this section of what was then the 
Companies Bill, (17 October 2006) various MPs alluded to lobbying by the Trade Justice Movement and the 
Corporate Responsibility Coalition both of which would have preferred stronger sanctions against directors: see 
http://www.tjm.org.uk/trade-issues/past-campaign-success/28-massive-public-campaign-changes-
accountability-law-for-corporations-2006/229-companies-act-a-move-forward-to-right-corporate-wrongs-.html 
 and http://corporate-responsibility.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/09/Companies_Bill_Supporter_Verdict__Long_Nov06.pdf   
73  Hansard, House of Commons, 17 October 2006, column 790.  
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Since s.172(1) of the Companies Act 2006 came into force74, as explained in the next 
paragraph, there have been a few cases that refer to s.172(1)(f), where the petitioner is a 
member of the company and seeking redress for the benefit of the company for not being 
treated properly75, but only one76 where there was an attempt to raise an action for the failure 
to have regard to the various matters in s.172(1)(a)-(e). This could mean that: 
 although the right to raise an action in respect of any of those matters exists, such a 
right is not a realistic way of solving a problem involving directors’ neglect of the 
stakeholder interests indicated in s.172(1)(a)-(e); 
 liquidators have other, generally more certain, means of seeking redress from past 
directors (in particular, s.172(3));  
 liquidators and incoming shareholders are not particularly interested in whether or not 
the past directors had regard to any other stakeholders, or are not prepared to spend 
money finding out; 
 most shareholders do not know about s.172(1)(a)-(e) or if they do, do not care about it 
enough to do anything about it; 
 the cost of bringing a petition puts potential litigators off; 
 even if the petitioner has a point, the bad publicity that would be attracted to the 
company by a court case would probably have a deleterious effect on the company’s 
share price; 
 if there are problems with a listed company’s directors, by far the easiest solution is to 
sell its shares77; 
 directors are often not worth suing. 
 
The derivative claim 
                                                 
74 1st October 2007. 
75 For example, West Coast Capital (LIOS) Limited, Petitioner, [2008] CSOH 72.  
76 R.(on the application of People and Planet) v H.M. Treasury, [2009] EWHC 3020 (Admin), discussed 
shortly. This was not actually an action against the directors but a review of the way that the Government as the 
majority shareholders was running the company.   
77 Petitioning the court about the directors’ decision-making would be expensive and might even lead to the 
share price being adversely affected. 
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Hitherto it has been suggested that to enforce s.172(1), the company would have to take 
action against a director. This could be done by a derivative claim, a statutory procedure, 
provided for under ss.365-369 of the Act, which allows a shareholder, on behalf of the 
company, to raise an action on the company’s behalf and for its benefit against a director. 
There already has been a number of cases, in every case so far in small companies, where a 
shareholder has taken advantage of the new derivative claim to petition the court for redress 
for some mischief done to the company by a director.78 Under the derivative claim, an 
aggrieved shareholder who believes that a director has neglected his duty to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole may petition the court for 
permission to represent the company in an action against that director. The petitioner has to 
persuade the court that he has a prima facie case79 against the director for the director’s 
breach of duty, and if the petition is successful, and the court allows the case to proceed with 
the shareholder now representing the company, any damages payable by the director for his 
failure to promote the success of the company would be payable to the company.80 A good 
example is Hughes v Weiss81 where a company was set up by two lawyers with the intention 
of providing consultancy advice on various financial matters. Both lawyers had equal shares 
in the ownership and management of the company, and both were directors, but Weiss took it 
upon himself to seize a large proportion of the company’s funds, claiming that he was entitled 
to it for various reasons which the judge found unconvincing. The court held that Hughes had 
made out a prima facie case that Weiss had failed to act fairly as between the members in 
terms of s.172(1)(f).82  
Indeed, the case law to date on derivative claims at present seems to be limited to members 
being treated badly by the directors in terms of s.172(1)(f) (acting fairly as between members 
of the company). Only one reported case so far has been an attempt to get anyone to pay 
attention to the matters in s.172(1), (a)-(e). This case was R.(on the application of People and 
Planet) v H.M. Treasury,83 where a pressure group sought judicial review of the way that a 
Government company, UK Financial Investment Ltd, which represented the Government’s 
                                                 
78 For example, Wishart Ptnr [2009] CSOH 20;  Phoenix Contracts (Leicester) Ltd  [2010] EWHC 2375; 
79 For an explanation of what would be considered a prima facie case, see Gillespie v Toondale Ltd, 2006 S.C. 
304.   
80 Not to the member himself. He is merely acting on the company’s behalf and obtains little personal benefit 
except insofar as any redress from the director benefits the company and thereby indirectly the value of the 
member’s shares.  
81 [2012] EWHC 2363 (Ch). 
82 At paras 34-41. A similar case exemplifying the use of s.172(1)(f) is Phillips v Fryer [2013] B.C.C. 176. 
83 [2009] EWHC 3020 (Admin) 
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interest in Royal Bank of Scotland, and which owned 70% of that bank’s equity, was run by 
the Treasury. The pressure group felt that as the Government effectively owned so much of 
the Royal Bank, the Bank should be run in accordance with the interests of Companies Act 
2006 s.172(1) in mind, in particular paying attention to climate change and human rights. The 
application was unsuccessful, and permission for judicial review was not granted, on the 
grounds that the Treasury had taken some account of such matters, but there were many other 
matters also to be considered by directors and due weight had to be given to them too. 
Climate change and human rights could not have a priority when it came to the amount of 
regard directors were required to pay to the various matters in s.172(1). A balance had to be 
found with all the other interests.  In any case, while the Treasury could put its views across 
to the board of directors of the Royal Bank of Scotland, ultimately it was for the directors to 
manage the bank and not for the Treasury.84 If this is the only case that even approaches the 
use of s.172(1)(a)-(e)85 it suggests that in the seven years since it has been enacted, either 
these provisions have not proved useful from the point of view of the various stakeholders 
concerned, or that no-one has been willing to launch a test case.  
However, merely because stakeholders have paid little attention to s.172(1) in the courts does 
not mean that directors are completely unaware of stakeholders’ interests, or are unaware that 
the legislation is trying to persuade directors to consider stakeholders’ interests. The 
Government commissioned a review of the Companies Act 2006 in 2010. The review 
established that most company directors were aware of s.172(1) of the Act, but were not 
necessarily putting it into practice.86  
Apart from s.172(1), what other guidance for directorial decision-making is there? 
There is no lack of guidance in the UK to encourage the proper and honest management of 
companies by directors. The Financial Reporting Council has a strong interest in ensuring the 
probity of accounts. Listed companies are obliged to follow the UK Corporate Governance 
Code.87 Its requirement for directors to “comply or explain” with generally accepted good 
practice within the terms of the Code is well understood.  Finally, many large companies over 
                                                 
84 At para.35. For a critique of this decision, see Copp, S.172 of the Companies Act 2006 fails people and 
planet? Comp. Law. 2010, 31(12), 406-408.  
85 In any case, this application was for judicial review, and was not a derivative claim. 
86 S. Fettiplace and R. Addis, Evaluation of the Companies Act 2006 (2 August 2010), at p.3 of summary, 
available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/e/10-1363-evaluation-companies-act-2006-
summary-main-findings.pdf   
87 Available at http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Corporate-
Governance-Code.aspx  
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the last few years have adopted “statements of values” or internal ethical codes in an effort to 
make directors and employees to treat their customers, suppliers and fellow staff members 
properly.88  
Scandals 
However, notwithstanding the existence of CA 2006 s.172(1), the Corporate Governance 
Code and various statements of values, business history suggests that in certain sectors of 
business, in particular banking, directors of companies were not paying any attention to any 
of these requirements. Some recent scandals include the following:  
 
 
 A report for the US Senate indicated that HSBC had been laundering money 
(particularly of “hot” South and Central American money) for years.89  The report 
indicated that the US arm of the bank was woefully understaffed and out of its depth 
in its compliance and anti-money laundering departments.90 While the bank did not 
hide its involvement in these questionable practices in its 2010 annual report,91 its 
compliance statement did not reveal any difficulties.92 Its compliance statement in that 
                                                 
88 For examples, see Barclays Bank at 
http://www.barclays.com/supplier/aiming_high_commercial_principles.html   
89 US Vulnerability to Money-laundering, drugs, and terrorist financing: HSBC case history,  Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations, US Senate, December 2012 available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/levin-statement-on-hsbc-settlement 
90 David Bagley, the UK head of compliance during the time of the money-laundering, resigned during the 
Senate Sub-committee hearing on HSBC’s money-laundering activities, blaming the bank’s rapid growth and 
challenging circumstances, implicitly admitting his own ability to prevent the abuses that had been taking place 
under his watch. 
91 See HSBC’s annual report for 2010 at page 82.  
92 The following is from the 2010 HSBC annual report at p.154 under the heading of “Compliance risk”. 
“Compliance risk falls within the definition of operational risk. All Group companies are required to observe the 
letter and spirit of all relevant laws, codes, rules, regulations and standards of good market practice. These rules, 
regulations, other standards and Group policies include those relating to anti-money laundering, counter terrorist 
financing and sanctions compliance. The Group Compliance function supports line management in ensuring that 
there are adequate policies and procedures, and is responsible for maintaining adequate resources to mitigate 
compliance risk. The GMO Compliance department oversees the global compliance function and is headed by 
the Head of Group Compliance who in turn reports to the Group Chief Risk Officer. There are compliance 
teams in all of the countries where we operate. These compliance teams are principally overseen by Regional 
Compliance Officers located in Europe, North America, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia-Pacific. 
Group Compliance policies and procedures require the prompt identification and escalation to GMO 
Compliance of all actual or suspected breaches of any law, rule, regulation, Group policy or other relevant 
requirement. These escalation procedures are supplemented by a requirement for the submission of compliance 
certificates at the halfyear and year-end by all Group companies detailing any known breaches as above. The 
contents of these escalation and certification processes are used for reporting to the Risk Management Meeting, 
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report said that all group companies were required to comply with the requirement to 
observe the letter and spirit of all relevant laws, but it did not indicate that they had 
actually done so.  
 Standard Chartered bank, despite the existence of sanctions against dealing with Iran, 
persistently ignored those sanctions over a period of ten years up to 2010.93 This is in 
contrast to the values espoused by the bank in its annual report for the year 2010.94  
 The US subsidiary of UK company, GlaxoSmithKline, was fined $3 billion in July 
2012 for deliberately withholding vital safety data about its best-selling diabetes drug, 
Avandia, and in particular the effect of that drug on hearts. The company had also 
been paying bribes to doctors and recommending unsuitable anti-depressants to 
children.95 
 SSE, formerly South of Scotland Electricity, formally admitted breaches of mis-
selling electricity and was fined £10.3 million by Ofgem on 3 March 2013. While 
there was no suggestion that senior management actively participated in the mis-
selling or was wilfully in breach of the company’s licence conditions, senior 
management was criticised for its non-involvement in compliance and oversight of 
sales activities, and its reluctance to consider that commission-hungry salesmen might 
not be treating the company’s customers properly.96  
These are some scandals that are known. There may be others still hidden or sufficiently 
successful that they have yet to surface. All these scandals took place within British banks 
and other British companies or in their foreign but British-controlled subsidiaries. With 
regard to CA 2006 s.172(1), these scandals have not been good either for the shareholders or 
customers, let alone the banks’ reputations for high standards of business practice. New 
management has been imposed in some of these banks since the scandals, and there have 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Group Risk Committee and the Board and disclosure in the Annual Report and Accounts and Interim Report, 
if appropriate.” 
93 See BBC business news 10 Dec 2012. 
94 See in particular, page 39, where the following is stated: “Our brand promise, Here for good, reaches out to all 
our stakeholders, including our employees, through a simple and compelling promise. It says who we are, what 
we stand for and what makes us different. Here for good captures our genuine commitment to our customers and 
clients, our staff and the communities where we operate; our focus on consistently doing the right thing and 
acting responsibly; and our aim to continually lead the way across Asia, Africa and the Middle East. It has 
raised the bar on how we demonstrate our values through our everyday business activity.” 
95 BBC News, US and Canada, 2 July 2012. 
96 See the Ofgem’s SSE – Notice of Intention to impose a financial penalty on SSE for failure to comply with 
Standard Licence Conditions 23 and 25 at paras. 134 and 149, 3 March 2013.  
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been protestations of the need for new standards of conduct, a new culture, retraining and no 
repetition of improper behaviour.97 But while the improper practices were taking place, there 
was little suggestion in the annual reports that anything was amiss. The question then arises: 
to what extent did the directors of the banks at the time know what was going on? If they did, 
they were in breach of Companies Act 2006 s.172(1); and if they did not know, the question 
arises of why they did not know.  
Awareness of s.172(1) 
It will probably never be known whether the various directors in the various companies above 
genuinely were unaware of unsatisfactory practices within their firms, vaguely knew what 
was going on, encouraged or turned a blind eye to the more disreputable practices, or even 
delighted in their “gaming”.98 There may have been a culture of wilful ignorance, so that 
directors could plead ignorance of their employees’ misdeeds and thus escape liability, or of 
creative compliance.99 While no director working at a senior level can be expected to know 
every dubious activity of his employees, it may be worth asking what steps directors took to 
ensure that any dubious activity was stamped out. All these companies had Audit and Risk 
committees on which directors will have sat. Those directors should have been mindful of the 
requirements of s.172(1), in particular the requirement to have regard to the interests of 
customers and to maintain a reputation for high standards of business conduct. It is most 
unlikely that the UK directors of the major banks above, or of GlaxoSmithKline and ESS, 
could have been unaware of s.172(1) and its requirements. These companies had company 
secretaries who would have ensured that directors had been told about the changes in the law 
from October 2007 to reflect s.172(1) coming into force.  
However, being told about s.172(1) is one thing: paying attention to it is another. A proper 
adherence to s.172(1) should have ensured that certain lucrative but questionable activities, 
                                                 
97 For example, the chief executive, Sir Anthony Jenkins, of Barclays Bank, in an echo of Barclays Bank’s 
original Quaker roots, wrote to all the bank’s employees on 16 January 2013 about his then new mantra called 
TRANSFORM, promoting the values of “respect, integrity, service, excellence and stewardship”.  Similar 
assertions were made by the directors of the Royal Bank of Scotland to the Treasury Select Committee on 
11February 2013. 
98 Andrew Bailey of the FSA told the Treasury Select Committee on 16th July 2012 that Barclays had a “culture 
of gaming” (i.e. sailing close to the wind in its compliance with regulations) and implied that that culture came 
from Bob Diamond, its then CEO.   
99 Doreen McBarnet , Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, for Law, University of 
Edinburgh - School of Law, March, 27 2009,  Working Paper No. 2009/03, available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1369305  . 
Doreen McBarnet, Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, Legal Integrity and the Banking 
Crisis, University of Edinburgh - School of Law, February 2, 2010, working paper series, 2010/02, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546486 .  
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such as money-laundering and mis-selling, did not take place. However, if, as described 
earlier, the sanction for non-adherence to s.172(1) is weak, and if there is a general culture of 
creative compliance with legislation anyway, a director has much to lose by adherence to 
s.172(1). Many of the directors, and other employees, were shareholders themselves, had 
generous bonus schemes and were entitled to share options which could be triggered on 
certain targets being achieved. It would not be in those persons’ interests to query anything 
that in the short term might adversely affect the share price or their bonuses or their 
promotion prospects; and it is interesting to note that one of the remedies that is now being 
proposed, particularly for the banks, is that directors and other senior executives should only 
be able to obtain certain benefits or bonuses if the company obtains long term gain, not 
merely short term market share or an increase in the share price obtained by rent-seeking 
officials.100 
To put the matter succinctly, the sort of directors who would have taken account of s.172 
would not need to be told to do so, and the sort of directors who ought to have been reminded 
of s.172(1) would not have troubled themselves about it anyway, because, it is suggested, 
there was no compulsion to adhere to its terms and little likelihood of any punishment for 
their failure to do so.101 It is possible to point to companies that probably did, and probably 
still do, all that is required under s.172(1) – The John Lewis Partnership is a good example – 
but they would have done so anyway because a company where the directors do take account 
of a wide range of stakeholder interests probably is quite a thoughtfully run company. Staff 
are valued, customers and suppliers treated properly, and the business is well regarded in the 
community. The irony of s.172(1) is that intrinsically what it expects directors to do makes a 
good deal of sense, but in the absence of effective sanctions, if directors wish to ignore 
s.172(1) for their own perceived short term advantage, or their employees’ or short-term 
shareholders’ advantage, they will do so, and the problems, when they arrive, will be for 
someone to sort out at some stage in the future, long after the directors and employees have 
cashed in their bonuses and their share options and moved elsewhere.   
 
 
                                                 
100 BBC News 5 February 2013, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21333527.  
101 For an expanded view of the same point, see N. Okoye, The BIS review and section 172 of the Companies 
Act 2006: what manner of clarity is needed?  2012, Company Lawyer. 33(1), 15-16 
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The failure of s.172(1) 
It has already been explained that s.172(1)(f) of the Companies Act 2006 can work well at a 
small company level in ensuring redress for some shareholders being treated badly by 
directors in terms of s.172(1)(f). In this respect one can take some small issue with the view 
of Elaine Lynch102 who asserts that “s. 172 brings little or nothing to the table”. But Lynch’s 
view in respect of the other parts of s.172(1), namely s.172(1)(a)–(e), would appear to be 
correct,  in that those provisions have proved in practice completely ineffective, at least as far 
as the large companies referred to earlier are concerned.  This view is also well advanced by 
Professor Andrew Keay.103  If this is correct, it suggests the requirement for directors to have 
regard to the various matters in s.172(1)(a)-(e) has moral suasion but no more. It is like 
patting a wolf on the head and asking it to be good. This does not mean that the provisions of 
that subsection are worthless, but rather that they are in practice sanctionless and therefore 
can afford to be ignored. Thus there is a return to the themes of this thesis, the second and 
third of which are 
 The use of law to alter business and social behaviour 
 The tension between intention of the legislation and the actuality 
S.172(1) was designed to make directors, in effect, behave well and to be good and 
thoughtful people when making directorial decisions. If directors did follow the precepts of 
s.172, the law might well alter business and social behaviour for the better. The evidence, so 
far, is that while s.172(1)(f) may be effective at a small company level, and as between 
directors and disgruntled shareholders, the rest of s.172(1) in the past was ignored by the 
directors of certain larger companies, did not alter business and social behaviour and that the 
gap between the intention of the legislation and the actuality was indeed wide.  
 
The redundancy of s.172(1) 
                                                 
102 Lynch, Section 172: a ground-breaking reform of directors’ duties, or the emperor’s new clothes? 2012 
Company Lawyer, (33(9), 196-203. 
103 Professor Keay has written extensively on this area (see 
http://www.law.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/events/directors-duties/keay-the-duty-to-promote-the-
success.pdf   and  Moving towards stakeholderism? Constituency statutes, enlightened shareholder value, and 
more: much ado about little? E.B.L. Rev. 2011, 22(1), 1-49,in particular) and his view is that s.172 has, frankly, 
not worked. He is not alone in this view: see D. Fisher, The Enlightened Shareholder -- Leaving Stakeholders in 
the Dark: Will Section 172 (1) of the Companies Act 2006 make Directors Consider the Impact of their 
Decisions on Third Parties [2009] I.C.C.L.R 10; 
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Notwithstanding all of the above, at the time of writing the banks are receiving such 
opprobrium that a cultural change is needed in order to regain customers’ trust. It will be 
commercial common sense that will now ensure that directors take more trouble to find out 
what is happening within their companies. It is not the fear of shareholder litigation under 
s.172(1)  that will cause directors to adopt the very behaviour that s.172(1) hopes to instil. It 
is the fact that treating customers badly, and not playing by the rules, not surprisingly, in the 
long run has turned out to be bad for business. If a bank mistreats its customers, as Barclays 
and UBS did with LIBOR, and SSE did with those to whom it supplied electricity, it may 
well encourage at least some customers not to use those banks and companies again once the 
customers have found out what was happening.104 Misleading customers, or treating them 
with contempt, either by not genuinely given the best deal they should be getting, or 
deliberately confusing them, can be, in the longer run, unprofitable. The cost to SSE of the 
fine (£10.5 million) and the reimbursement of the customers who were mis-sold electricity is 
greater than the amount of money that the company made by mis-selling (estimated to be £4 
million).105 
The first theme in this thesis was achieving the balance between creditors and debtors. A 
bank relies on the trust that the bank’s creditors, its depositors, will not all demand their funds 
back at once, thus causing a run on the bank, as happened with Northern Rock. The bank has 
to convince its customers/creditors that its funds are in safe hands. The evidence of the 
scandals above suggests that the hands of the directors (as the ones ultimately responsible) 
were not in those cases as safe as they might have been, and that some directors have now 
realised that they also need to be seen over a considerable period of time to be clean and 
trustworthy hands.106 The paradox is that it has been commercial pressure and market forces, 
not s.172(1), that has ensured that lessons will have been learned – those lessons, ironically, 
being the same as those matters in s.172(1) to which directors are objured to “have regard”. 
The climate seems to be altering in favour of greater integrity in banking practice, at least as 
regards ordinary consumers. That it has altered is not as a result of s.172(1). It is because to 
continue as before is no longer commercially tenable. If this is the case, it almost suggests 
                                                 
104 Customers are notoriously reluctant to change theirs banks, but even if they do not change their banks, they 
are much more likely to be cautious about buying its products.  
105 See the Ofgem’s SSE – Notice of Intention to impose a financial penalty on SSE for failure to comply with 
Standard Licence Conditions 23 and 25 at para. 159, 3 March 2013. 
106 Anthony Jenkins, current CEO of Barclays Bank, said it would take five to ten years to rebuild trust in banks 
(speech to Brooke House Sixth Form College, East London, 31st December 2013) reported at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/antony-jenkins-admits-it-could-take-10-years-to-rebuild-
trust-in-barclays-9031350.html  
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that the provisions in s.172(1)(a)-(e) are unnecessary. The directors of a sensible company 
would do what s.172(1) expects, without those requirements having to be put in legislation. 
Whether or not these provisions are unnecessary, s.172(1)(a)-(e) is not going to go away. 
Even if the statute is not effective, it is what is on the statute book and it is unlikely that 
Parliamentary time would be found for its amendment. Instead, at the time of writing the 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards is considering the Treasury’s proposal that 
directors of a bank should face criminal sanctions if found guilty of serious misconduct in the 
management of that bank.107 This suggestion is not without its difficulties, but the active 
threat of imprisonment and fines, not to mention the ignominy of conviction, may concentrate 
directors’ minds more effectively than s.172(1) appears to have done.    
One may then ask why the politicians and their civil servants allowed such ineffective 
legislation as s.172(1) onto the statute book.  There were warnings, particularly from some 
Conservative MPs,108 that what eventually became s.172(1) would cause more difficulties 
than it solved. What did not appear to have been anticipated, at least in public, was that the 
section would be ignored. It was complied with to the extent that the board minutes could 
demonstrate that directors had had regard to it, but the fact that the scandals referred to above 
took place at all suggests that amongst the many other tasks directors have to contend with, 
actually paying attention to s.172(1) was a very low priority. As for the politicians, it could 
be said that there was an emotional and sentimental attachment to what seemed a socially 
desirable objective, irrespective of the practical feasibility of that objective.109 By the time 
that the voting on the second reading of the bill was to take place, they had persuaded 
themselves that it was worthwhile, and as the Labour party, which was supporting the bill, 
was in a majority in the House of Commons at the time, there was no difficulty in getting the 
motion passed.110  
Comparison with proposed legislation in Ireland 
It is telling that the current company law reform bill being discussed in the Republic of 
Ireland has made significant changes to many areas of company law – that country’s law 
                                                 
107 See the Treasury Discussion document, 3 July 2012, “Sanctions for the directors of failed banks”, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/81565/consult_sanctions_director
s_banks.pdf Responses to the consultation are still being considered by the Commission and the Treasury.  
108 See Hansard, House of Commons, 6 June 2006, columns 204-5. 
109 One can compare this to another famous example of well-intentioned but completely unworkable legislation, 
namely the 18th Amendment to the American constitution, being the prohibition in 1920 on the production, sale 
and transport of alcohol. The 21st Amendment in 1933 repealed the 18th Amendment. 
110 See Hansard House of Commons, 6 June 2006, column 219 
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being in many respects similar to UK law – but has expressly not introduced any attempt to 
draft directors’ duties in the manner shown in Companies Act 2006 s.172(1).111 The (Irish) 
Companies Bill, s.229(1), at present being discussed in the Dail, is the nearest equivalent to 
Companies Act 2006 s.172(1), but there is no mention of the need to have regard to the 
various stakeholders. There is instead a requirement to:  
(a)  act in good faith in what the director considers to be the interests of the company;  
(b)  act honestly and responsibly in relation to the conduct of the affairs of the company; 
(c)  act in accordance with the company’s constitution and exercise his or her powers only 
for the purposes allowed by law;  
(d)  not use the company’s property, information or opportunities for his or her own or 
anyone else’s benefit unless— 
(i) this is expressly permitted by the company’s constitution; or 
(ii) the use has been approved by a resolution of the company in general meeting; 
The simple but wide words “act honestly and responsibly in relation to the conduct of the 
affairs of the company” have much to commend them. It is evident from elsewhere in the Bill 
that the Irish have adopted much from the Companies Act 2006, but for good reason they did 
not replicate s.172(1). The words “honestly and responsibly” are particularly apt, and their 
lack of specificity is useful because it suggests that the directors should act honestly and 
responsibly not just to their companies, but to all those party to the “affairs of the company”. 
It does not resolve the irresoluble question of the duty to act responsibly only being owed to 
the company, but unlike s.172(1), as a duty it is easy for directors to understand and hard to 
avoid. It would be easy for a shareholder to point out that a director’s reluctance to ask, say, 
what its mis-selling sales representatives were doing, or why money-laundering was taking 
place, showed a failure to act honestly and responsibly. Were s.172(1) of the Companies Act 
2006 ever to be amended, there is much to be said for adopting the wording of the Irish 
Companies Bill s.229(1)(b).  
 
                                                 
111 The author is not aware of the adoption of the wording in the UK of s.172(1) in any other Commonwealth 
country.  
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Conclusion 
One intention behind the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007 was that making 
it easier for debtors to apply for their own sequestration would be a social good in that it 
would relieve those who were unlikely ever to be able to pay their debts from the crushing 
effect of debt and allow them more easily to start afresh.  It might also reduce the stigma of 
bankruptcy. The use of Bankruptcy Restrictions Orders and Undertakings would provide a 
counterbalance where the debtors had behaved unsatisfactorily either in the period leading up 
to their sequestration or thereafter. Greater availability of sequestration might also lead to 
more responsible lending. The greater availability of sequestration certainly led to a marked 
rise in applications to the Accountant in Bankruptcy, suggesting that there was a need that 
was being met, but it is not evident that the stigma of bankruptcy has been eradicated, and 
realistically the Scottish debt market, being only a tenth of the English and Welsh one, was 
probably not large enough for the greater availability of sequestration to alter lenders’ 
profligacy in making loans. Wider commercial factors elsewhere in the loan industry, and 
increased regulation generally, have been more effective in that respect. 
As regards diligence, the remedies available in the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) 
Act 2007 were meant to provide a better degree of protection for debtors than before, and to 
ensure that creditors had to treat debtors in a kindlier manner than before. In return, creditors 
would have rights over almost all of a debtor’s assets. The latter part of the arrangement was 
not brought into force, which meant that in effect it was business as normal for creditors, 
except that there were more hurdles for creditors to jump through, which in turn increased 
debtors’ expenses. There was no evidence that the changes in the law made debtors quicker to 
pay their bills. However, in fairness, the codification of some of the common law on 
diligence has made the process of diligence easier to follow and to apply. 
As regards company law, it is evident that while many aspects of the Companies Act 2006 
were useful, s.172, which was specifically designed to try to alter directors’ behaviour and to 
make directors act in a more thoughtful manner, was not successful. A fundamental weakness 
in the legislation enabled directors not to take it seriously, and the evidence is that it made 
very little difference to the management of companies, and that Parliament was seduced by 
the goodness of its own intentions into overlooking the practicalities of its implementation.   
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
The previous chapters, and the books that are the subject of this critical appraisal, 
demonstrate certain themes relating to certain areas of business law. These themes are    
 Achieving the balance between the interests of debtors and creditors, 
 The use of legislation to alter business and social behaviour 
 The tension between the intention of the legislation and the actuality 
What has also been demonstrated is that the way that politicians practise politics does not 
always sit easily with their attempts to regulate how business is carried out. As was 
particularly demonstrated in the case of s.172 of the Companies Act 2006, what may appeal 
to politicians’ ideas, particularly at an emotional level, of how businesses ought to be run, 
needs to be dispassionately considered and understood by politicians with an eye to its 
practical effectiveness and the extent to which its ideals are accepted by those likely to be 
accepted by the legislation; and when this does not take place, the legislation will not achieve 
its intended result. By contrast, effective legislation in the field of business law is legislation, 
such as certain parts of the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007, that takes 
proper account of both the debtors’ and the creditors’ views, is not over-ambitious or 
sentimental, and does not have unrealistic expectations of the end result.  
It is important to consider what lessons may be drawn from all this. This last chapter 
therefore provides an overview of the limitations of legislation in the context of the three 
themes with reference to the publications referred to throughout this thesis.  
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Achieving the balance between the interests of debtors and creditors 
In the realm of corporate law, this thesis chose to discuss this theme in the context of recent 
developments in the corporate veil. The Prest case has very clearly indicated that the veil 
should by lifted in very restricted circumstances, namely the evasion of a legal responsibility 
or the frustration of the law. A controlling shareholder or director may then be liable, 
particularly if the company itself is insolvent or not worth suing. Should a company be used 
for similar purposes but not evidently at the instance of a controlling shareholder or director, 
while the victim may still have a right of relief against the company (unless it is insolvent or 
not worth suing) the controlling shareholder or director may escape without liability. This 
clearly places the creditor at a disadvantage.  Creditors must do what they can to limit their 
risk but our law has chosen to place the risk with creditors even if that leads to “hard cases”.   
As regards the law of bankruptcy, the law prior to the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2007 was not entirely unfair to creditors, but the 2007 Act in a number of 
small but on the whole effective ways pushed the balance towards in the debtor’s favour, 
though there are some benefits to creditors too. Debtor applications have made the possibility 
of sequestration easier for debtors. Third parties contracting with debtors, unaware of the 
debtor’s sequestration, are now better protected than before. The law is undoubtedly more 
complex than it was before but it is more humane. Debtors are now only bankrupt for one 
year instead of three. In the past someone contracting to buy a house from a debtor at the time 
of the debtor’s sequestration could have paid the purchase price and ended up losing the 
purchase money and the house, with the only solace being a right against his solicitor if he 
could prove that the solicitor had been negligent. All the innocent purchaser would have 
wanted was to have moved into his new house – and this the legislation has achieved. It is 
true that overall creditors may receive less as a result, but as has been explained before, most 
creditors, with the exception of involuntary creditors such as delict-victims or H.M. Revenue 
and Customs, are in a position to bargain with the debtor, or at least can choose to deal with 
the debtor and to factor into their costs the likelihood of the debtor’s default – this is not so 
likely to be the case with an innocent purchaser of the debtor’s house. 
As regards diligence, the position of the debtor is mixed. Because of the Scottish 
Government’s reluctance to introduce a form of land attachment, at least to date, debtors 
owning heritage are relatively fortunate, since few creditors will use adjudication for debt, 
and sequestration as a method of debt recovery is uncertain and slow. The methods of 
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diligence referred to shortly, although broadly beneficial to the creditor, are tempered by 
many opportunities for the debtor, or anyone with an interest in the debtor’s property, to be 
relieved of the diligence where the execution of the diligence could be “unduly harsh”. On 
the other hand, the clarification of the laws relating to arrestment, inhibition, together with 
arrestment and inhibition on the dependence, money attachment, and interim attachment 
mean that the creditor’s armoury is better stacked than was the case previously.  
 
The use of law to alter social and business behaviour 
As explained earlier, this critical appraisal sought to demonstrate that the attempt by 
legislation, particularly s.172 of the Companies Act 2006, to make directors behave in a 
particular moral way, and in particular to persuade directors to have regard to their 
companies’ reputation for high standards of business conduct and to consider the interests of 
customers and suppliers, fell on deaf ears. That it did so was for a variety of main reasons, the 
principal one of which was that there was no effective sanction in law for directors’ failure to 
follow this vague instruction. A second reason was that it was often not in shareholders’ 
interests to object to the directors’ behaviour provided profits were good. In any case, if the 
shareholders did not like what the directors were doing, it was easier just to sell their 
shares.112 A third reason was that it suited directors to ignore the interests of the creditors or 
long term shareholders because they were focussed on producing high short term profits 
which would allow payment of bonuses and cause the share price to rise, thereby triggering 
further benefits for directors and many other staff by way of exercising share options.  
As has already been narrated, the obsession with generating profits led to a lack of attention 
to wider considerations, not least the long term source of those profits and their sustainability, 
namely the interests of customers. The failure to get the balance right as regards customers’ 
interests ultimately has led to revisiting the concerns of those customers and to regaining their 
trust; paradoxically the banking crisis has had the effect that the directors of at least some 
companies are now actively doing what s.172 of the Companies Act 2006 would have them 
                                                 
112 This was not always the case: for example, the directors of the holding company, Covea, sacked the entire 
board of its subsidiary Swinton Insurance because the board members of Swinton were putting their own 
interests ahead of its shareholders. But in this case, the shareholders were a holding company as opposed to a 
diverse body of shareholders (http://www.insuranceage.co.uk/insurance-age/news/2132072/entire-swinton-
executive-board-sacked).  
57 
 
to –  not because s.172 tells them to do so, but because commercially it is prudent to do so. 
The market, not the legislation, has been the effective motive behind compliance.  
s.172 of the Companies Act 2006 did not prove effective in making directors take account of 
stakeholders’ interests and failed to alter social and business behaviour. The market has done 
this, but not as result of the legislation. The lesson to be drawn from this is first that 
sanctionless legislation is not a good method for trying to make people behave well, and 
secondly that exhortatory legislation, designed to achieve certain apparently desirable social, 
or even moral, objectives, or promote certain values, is futile. The political attempt to make 
directors behave well was worthily intentioned, but in the haste of the political process, 
politicians, meaning for the best, and thinking that what they were doing would look good to 
a wider audience, fell prey to wishful thinking. The pragmatic wording of the current Irish 
Companies Bill would both have been less ambitious and more effective. 
 The Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007 had originally hoped to change 
Scotland’s culture to one of being more accepting of bankruptcy than used to be the case, and 
by reducing the period of bankruptcy to one year to be more encouraging of entrepreneurs. If 
the culture has changed, it is not evident, and the encouragement of entrepreneurs probably 
owes more to the availability of finance than to the period of time a debtor remains a 
bankrupt. These social ambitions were unrealistic, whereas the other reforms within that Act 
were realistic, achievable and on the whole unexceptionable.  
 
Tension between the intention of the legislation and the actuality  
Harold Wilson, whenever asked on television about some current difficulty, would light his 
pipe, puff out some smoke and say smoothly that he was bringing in legislation to deal with 
the difficulty. Whether or not it was true, it would generally quell the interviewer. The 
implication was that legislation always fixes problems. It is true that some legislation does 
resolve some problems sometimes. The Smoking, Health and Social Care (Scotland) Act 
2005 may have proved difficult for public houses, but has been beneficial in many other 
respects, including unexpectedly reducing the incidence of childhood asthma.113 That Act’s 
success is due to the fact that smoking was increasingly seen in the wider population as 
socially unacceptable, and self-evidently expensive and unhealthy. The Act was merely 
                                                 
113 See http://www.ashscotland.org.uk/ash/5510 
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reinforcing an existing and well-established view. There was no attempt to suggest that 
smoking was “bad” or immoral: it just made it difficult to smoke in certain places and it was 
relatively easy to establish sanctions for non-compliance. The problem with s.172 of the 
Companies Act 2006 was that the lack of clarity as to the sanctions for non-compliance, the 
general vagueness of the provision, and the disinclination of directors to take it seriously 
meant that its effectiveness was always going to be problematic. There was little enthusiasm 
outside Parliament for the proposed wording. The Government appears in retrospect to have 
been blinded by the benevolence of its own good intentions to the reluctance of business and 
the legal profession to engage with this section. Small private companies  with directors who 
were also the shareholders were always unlikely to trouble themselves with the wording of 
that section, and as has been seen, larger companies, unless they were already actively 
engaged in such practices themselves, as a few were, merely paid lip-service to it. The 
attempt by Parliament to impose moral values on directors frankly failed.  By contrast, The 
Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007 was reasonably successful because, with 
some exceptions, it did not attempt to be too ambitious and its intentions were broadly 
acceptable to those affected by the Act, and made no pretensions as to imposing moral 
standards on anyone.  
 
Good-enough legislation 
This thesis, and the books that are the subject of this thesis, have tried to demonstrate some of 
the weaknesses in political attempts to effect social change in the world of business by 
legislation.  Although it is easy to be censorious of the inadequacies of legislation, and 
imperfect as some of it may have been, the legislation discussed in this thesis, and in the 
books referred therein, taken as a whole made some difference for the better: most of it was 
“good enough”. It is perhaps unreasonable to expect every part of the Companies Act 2006, 
at its time the longest ever Act in the UK with its 1,300 sections, all to be perfect. S.172 was 
clearly less than perfect, and this thesis demonstrates how utterly it was ignored by those to 
whom it was directed. It is a good demonstration of the futility of politicians trying to impose 
moral values in business by legislation. In commercial matters, law that simplifies 
procedures, is clearly set out, has clear sanctions, and is broadly accepted by those at its 
receiving end probably works: laws that try to change directors’ mind-sets or impose moral 
guidelines may do no harm, but without sanctions or acceptance by those for whom the 
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legislation is intended are unlikely to work well; and in the absence of sanctions, commercial 
necessity is a great deal more effective than any amount of legislation, however well 
intended, in effecting worthwhile change for the better. 
 
The future 
As for the future, the Holyrood Parliament has introduced the Bankruptcy and Debt Advice 
(Scotland) Bill to make further changes towards the ease of access to sequestration and to the 
Debt Arrangement Scheme. It remains to be seen how achievable some of its objectives will 
be, in particular the implementation of financial education for former debtors, but at the time 
of writing there have been no major objections to the Bill overall. Quite how the education 
will be carried out or assessed will be interesting to observe. The Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2013 has made some changes to the Companies Act 2006, for example in the 
field of directors’ salaries,114 for which there is considerable support, but there are no changes 
being made to s.172 of the Companies Act 2006. There are no attempts in the 2013 Act to 
start imposing morality on directors. The experiment of s.172 failed; if it had been successful 
it would have been adopted in other English-speaking jurisdictions, but it has not been; 
perhaps the legislature has learned its lesson, and lawmakers will know for the future that 
legislating for people’s consciences is an unrewarding activity.   
                                                 
114 At ss.79-82 
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